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Hahn and Hird provide the first comprehensive analysis of the costs and
benefits offederal economic and social regulation. They assess several alterna-
tive methods of measuring the effects of regulatory policies, noting the advan-
tages and drawbacks of each. They find that previous estimates of the costs
of economic regulation probably overstated the true costs by failing to distin-
guish between transfer payments and net changes in economic efficiency. Their
study separates transfers from efficiency costs for each estimate and updates
the figures for sixteen industries and seven areas of social regulation. Overall,
they find that the efficiency cost due to economic regulation is large and that
the benefit from social regulation is positive but small. Their study also finds
a huge variation in estimates of the costs and benefits ofparticular regulatory
policies, particularly in the transportation sector and in environmental protec-
tion. This variation indicates that most estimates may be merely "guess-
timates. " Nevertheless, Hahn and Hird argue that since the current political
climate has increased the pressure on Congress to add regulatory burdens, the
need to introduce such information into policy making has never been greater.
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The Costs and Benefits of Regulation
Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed both an unparalleled rise in new
regulations as well as significant deregulatory reform. New agencies such as
the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
emerged, while Congress either eliminated or sharply curtailed the activities
of others, such as the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce
Commission.'
The impact of regulatory activity on the economy continues to be a hotly
debated subject.2 While few would deny that regulations have added substan-
tially to the costs of doing business, the impact of regulation on the overall
economy is more difficult to ascertain. The issue takes on even greater impor-
tance as U.S. firms find it increasingly difficult to compete in the global
marketplace.' Yet, simultaneously, the public clamors for more regulation,
particularly in the area of environmental protection.
Current fiscal pressures, in the wake of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 4 and
the budget "crisis," are likely to encourage Congress and the President increas-
ingly to use social regulation as a tool for achieving political objectives. This
political environment encourages legislators to substitute off-budget regulatory
costs for on-budget expenditures that might exceed the deficit constraints
legislation imposes.5 For example, President Bush asked for $12 billion in
additional direct expenditures for new initiatives6 while implicitly asking for
at least that much in increased compliance costs for his proposed reauthoriza-
tion of the Clean Air Act alone.' We project that this trend towards increased
regulation will continue in the near future. Consequently, it is imperative to
assess carefully the benefits and costs of these regulations in order to allow
politicians and bureaucrats to make more informed decisions. Moreover, it is
important to understand exactly what factors are included in different types of
estimates of the costs and benefits of regulation.
Social scientists have attempted to measure the impacts of regulatory
changes using a variety of estimation techniques. Most of the studies that
1. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, RETHINKING REGULA-
TION 187 (1989).
2. See Hahn, Regulation: Past, Present and Future, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167, 228 (1990).
3. See generally M. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 507-41 (1990).
4. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 602-922, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1104-1109, 42 U.S.C. § 911 (1988)).
5. Hahn, Instrument Choice, Political Reform and Economic Welfare, 67 PUB. CHOICE 243, 246
(1990).
6. G. Bush, Building a Better America 181 (Feb. 9, 1989) (release to Congress).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
8. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1989, at Cl, col. 6; Hahn, The Politics and Religion of Clean Air, REGULA-
TION, Winter 1990, at 21, 24.
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examine the impact of regulatory changes focus on either the costs imposed
by one or two federal regulatory agencies9 or the effects on a single indus-
try.o Researchers have calculated very different estimates of regulatory costs.
For example, estimates measuring the benefits of partial railroad deregulation
vary by more than two orders of magnitude. Such wide-ranging estimates result
from a variety of factors including a paucity of data as well as the difficulty
in constructing a sound structural model.
In addition to studying specific regulatory changes, a few researchers have
attempted to develop monetary estimates of the aggregate impact of regulation.
Weidenbaum and DeFina suggest that the annual cost of regulation to the
economy is in excess of $100 billion in 1988 dollars." Litan and Nordhaus
use a similar methodology to arrive at an estimate of annual cost between $67
and $177 billion."2 Neither of these estimates reflects recent regulatory
changes during the Carter and Reagan Administrations, such as the dramatic
deregulation of trucking, railroads, natural gas, oil, and airlines. Moreover,
neither attempts to address the benefits that accrue from federal regulation,
particularly in the areas of health, safety, and environmental protection.
Our study attempts to fill this void. The analysis provides the first compre-
hensive estimates of the costs and benefits of federal regulation in the United
States. Previous estimates of the costs of economic regulation probably over-
state the true costs because they fail to distinguish between transfer payments
and net changes in economic efficiency. Both quantities are important, but for
different reasons. Transfer paymentsmeasure the amount a regulatory change
redistributes from losers to winners, while changes in net surplus indicate the
overall impact on the economy.
We also find a large variance in the cost estimates for particular regulatory
policies, most.notably in the transportation sector. This variation leads us to
conclude that existing tools for estimating regulatory impacts are extremely
imprecise, and that most estimates more properly are viewed as "guessti-
mates." The range of uncertainty is even larger for benefit estimates. These
uncertainties notwithstanding, the need to introduce such information into
policy making has never been greater because in the current political climate
Congress and the President feel increased pressure to add regulatory burdens.13
9. See Gray, The Cost of Regulation: OSHA, EPA and the Productivity Slowdown, 77 AM. EcON.
REV. 998 (1987).
10. See R. CRANDALL, H. GRUENSPECHT, T. KEELER & L. LAVE, REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE
(1986) [hereinafter CRANDALLI.
11. M. WEDENBAUM & R. DEFINA, THE COST OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF ECONOMIC AcTrvTY
(American Enterprise Institute Reprint No. 88, 1978) ($66. I billion in 1976 dollirs). All figures in the text
are in 1988 dollars. The footnotes provide the original dollar amounts in the relevant year dollars.
12. R. LrrAN & W. NORDHAuS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 23 (1983) ($34.7 to $90.6 billion
in 1977 dollars).
13. Furthermore, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 require agencies to provide cost and benefit
estimates for all new and major federal regulations. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1990); Exec.
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Our analysis builds on the microeconomic approach most studies of regula-
tion use to quantify changes in economic efficiency. The primary contribution
of this paper is to provide an up-to-date synthesis of the literature on regulatory
costs and benefits along with estimates of the overall impact of federal regula-
tion.
Part I of this Article reviews the extensive empirical literature measuring
the impact of regulation and notes the strengths and weaknesses of different
research strategies. Part II analyzes more recent studies, and provides revised
estimates of the cost of regulatory compliance and of the economic benefits
of social regulation. It also explores the limitations of the analysis in light of
various uncertainties in the estimates. The Conclusion suggests some areas for
future research. The Appendix contains summaries of the various studies used
in compiling the numerical estimates. Unless noted otherwise, we have
translated all figures in the text into 1988 dollars using the Consumer Price
Index. We provide the original dollar figures in the footnotes.
I. Approaches to Estimating Regulatory Impacts
There are several ways to measure the impact of regulation. The first
section outlines the general problems analysts confront in estimating regulatory
impacts. The second section explores how one can derive such estimates by
focusing on particular industries under the assumption that prices in other
sectors remain unaffected. The third section reviews attempts to evaluate
regulatory costs by examining the economy as a whole. The fourth section
considers the role of political costs. The final section lays out the basic frame-
work this Article uses.
A. The Methodological Problem
Perhaps the most difficult task in estimating the impact of a regulatory
change is specifying what would have happened in the absence of that change.
The researcher must engage in the delicate art of constructing a "counterfac-
tual," which describes what might have happened if the change had not
occurred. By comparing the effects of the counterfactual with those of the pro-
posed activity, it is possible to estimate the differences in costs and benefits
between the real and the hypothetical states of the world.
In hindsight, one can easily discern certain biases in the way researchers
constructed their counterfactuals. For example, ex ante studies of deregulation
frequently made two basic assumptions, which, in retrospect, turn out to be
unreasonable. First, they assumed that the proposed deregulatory change would
Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. § 323 (1990).
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result in an efficient industry structure much like the results of the textbook
competitive equilibrium. Second, they failed to control adequately for changes
in technology and service resulting from deregulation. The assumption that
deregulation would produce an efficient outcome introduced an upward bias
into ex ante estimates of the benefits of deregulation. In contrast, assumptions
about technological change and service quality often introduced a downward
bias. The airline deregulation that took place in the late 1970s illustrates both
points. Post-deregulation changes in the structure of the industry led to the
formation of some markets that were not efficient. Only one or two companies
served some routes, allowing firms to exercise significant control over price
in some cases." Yet, almost no one expected the airline industry to adopt
hub-and-spoke networks on such a large scale.'"
Once the analyst has specified a counterfactual, various approaches are
available to quantify the impact of regulations. These approaches differ in three
key ways. First, they model linkages in the economy to different extents.
Second, their estimation procedures differ. Finally, they differ in the effects
they measure.
This Article emphasizes those approaches aimed at measuring losses or
gains in economic efficiency. Economic studies of regulation measure changes
in consumer and producer welfare due to regulatory policies.' 6 There are two
types of models one can use to address this problem. At one extreme are
partial equilibrium models, which view each industry in isolation. At the other
extreme are models that explicitly incorporate linkages within the economy.
These include macroeconomic models and general equilibrium models.
14. See Kahn, I Would Do It Again, REGULATION, No. 2, 1988, at 22, 25. There is a great deal of
controversy over whether the airline merger policies of the Department of Transportation in the 1980s led
to increases or decreases in efficiency. Id. at 25-26; Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking
Forward, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 341-43 (1990); S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, TmE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF AIRLIN DEREGULATION 72-73 (1986).
15. See Kahn, Airline Deregulation-A Mixed Bag, But a Clear Success Nevertheless, 16 TRANSp.
L.J. 229, 246-47 (1988).
16. Efficiency is a favorite measure of economists because theoretically it is possible to divide the
gains from a more efficient policy in ways that make each citizen at least as well off as under the existing
policy. This view has come under criticism from the "public choice" school of economics, which notes
that resources spent in changing policies may not be recoverable. See infra notes 45 to 47 and accompany-
ing text.
Other measures economists frequently use to examine the impact of regulations include changes in
employment, industry-specific output, gross national product, and productivity. We emphasize that there
is no "correct" measure. As policy analysts, we prefer to use efficiency because it has a firmer grounding
in economic theory, but the reader should know of its limitations in practice. See Bromley, The Ideology
of Efficiency: Searching for a Theory of Policy Analysis, 19 J. ENv. ECON. MGMT. 86 (1990). For an
overview of various methods for addressing the impact of economic regulation, see Joskow & Rose, The
Effects of Economic Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1449, 1453-64 (R.
Schmalensee & R. Willig ed. 1989).
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B. Partial Equilibrium Models
Economists have applied partial equilibrium models to two categories of
regulatory problems-those pertaining to economic regulation and those involv-
ing social regulation. 7 Estimating the efficiency gains from airline deregula-
tion is an example of the former. Estimating the reduction in health costs
associated with removing lead from gasoline is an example of the latter.
1. Evaluating the Costs of Economic Regulation
The predominant approach for evaluating the effects of changes in econom-
ic regulation is to construct an econometric model based on the demand and
supply characteristics of an industry before and after a regulatory change.
Econometric studies typically evaluate output markets directly, or use produc-
tion and cost functions to measure the impact of regulatory change. For exam-
ple, Boyer estimates changes in rail rates due to deregulation by holding
constant variables such as weight, percentage of less-than-full truckload traffic,
and year of deregulation. 18 In another study, Morrison and Winston estimate
the probability that a traveler would choose air travel as a function of travel
cost, travel time, average time between scheduled departures, number of
travelers, and so on, to determine the efficiency and distributive impacts of
airline deregulation. 9 Econometric problems such as omitted variable bias,
poor data, and limited observations are common to many of these studies.
While such studies provide a formal statistical apparatus for testing hypotheses,
their formulation typically is general, glossing over the precise nature of actual
production functions.
2. Approaches for Evaluating Social Regulation
An array of approaches exists for estimating the effects of social regulation.
These methods include expenditure studies, engineering analyses, mathematical
programming techniques, econometric procedures, and surveys of individuals.
17. Economic regulation typically refers to regulation of prices and/or quantities of goods in a specific
industry. In contrast, social regulation typically affects several industries. For a discussion of this
distinction, see Joskow & Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC
REGULATION 1 (G. Fromm ed. 1981) [hereinafter STUDIES]; COUNCIL OF EcON. ADVISORS, supra note
1, at 187.
18. Boyer, The Costs of Price Regulation: Lessons from Railroad Deregulation, 18 RAND J. ECON.
408 (1987).
19. S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, supra note 14, at 11-52.
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a. Expenditure Studies
Expenditure evaluations of the cost of regulation frequently rely on surveys
of firms or businesses to determine costs of compliance. Examples include the
exhaustive Business Roundtable study of regulatory costs2 and the Survey
of Current Business' periodic evaluations of pollution abatement costs. 2'
While direct surveys produce easily quantified estimates of the regulatory
costs, this estimation approach poses several problems. First, respondents may
have biases. For example, a firm or corporation may inflate its estimated costs
hoping that politicians will consider providing regulatory relief. More impor-
tant, direct expenditure studies do not reveal that portion of costs that would
have been borne in the absence of regulation because they do not specify an
adequate counterfactual. For example, because of consumer demand, an
automobile company may choose to install stronger bumpers on its cars even
without a regulation requiring it to do so. Counting the added cost of such
bumpers as a product of regulation overstates its impact. Finally, regulations
can effectively eliminate products or shrink a firm's market. An expenditure
analysis would not account for such costs.
b. Engineering Approaches
Analysts use engineering approaches to calculate the added cost of installing
equipment directly, adjusting for quality changes. For example, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics conducts studies of automobile emissions and safety standards
by determining the cost of individual components added in response to various
regulations in order to compile their Consumer Price Index series.22 While
engineers may be able to measure the costs, estimating the total effect on
producing the remainder of the car is more problematic. Increasing a car's
resilience to side impacts may increase the cost of producing a door, but may
allow the manufacturer to reduce strength and cost in other parts of the car.
As with other methodologies, the problem of the counterfactual arises: how
would the car have been built in the absence of these regulations? Engineering
studies cannot easily determine how a regulation will affect input substitutions.
20. ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO., COST OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION STUDY FOR THE BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE (1979).
21. See, e.g., Farber & Rutledge, Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditures, 1982-85, SURv.
CURRENT Bus., May 1988, at 22.
22. CRANDALL, supra note 10, at 174.
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c. Mathematical Programming
One approach for estimating the costs and benefits of environmental policy
is to use linear or nonlinear programming techniques. 3 For example, the
costs of various policies for pollution control frequently are based on detailed
engineering studies. An analyst combines these cost estimates with estimates
of the benefits from different policies to compare the net economic efficiency
of policy alternatives. Such models are useful for gauging the impact of
individual policies, such as requiring removal of lead from gasoline. Neverthe-
less, in general, economists have not used these methods to develop estimates
of the. total costs of environmental regulation, even though in principle they
could.
d. Econometric Estimates
Econometric studies have measured both the costs and benefits of social
regulation.
i. Estimating Costs
A study by Crandall is representative of an econometric study quantifying
the cost of automobile regulation. Crandall estimates an ex post cost function
including both current and lagged regulatory constraints. The study controls
for automobile wheelbase, list prices, and dummy variables to account for data
discrepancies and Detroit's market misfortunes since 1980.4 Estimating the
cost of social regulation is similar in nature to estimating the cost of economic
regulation' in that economists specify a counterfactual and compare it with
the current regulatory regime. Peltzman's study of the economic effects of the
1962 drug amendments2 6 exemplifies econometric estimates of the demand
side of regulatory changes.7
ii. Estimating Benefits
A host of methods complements cost estimation procedures by measuring
the benefits associated with social regulation. Two ways to infer willingness
23. See generally J. FRANKLN, METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS (1980). For applications
to environmental problems, see R. HAIHN, A PRIMER ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DESIGN 6-18 (1989).
24. CRANDALL, supra note 10.
25. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
26. Drug (Kefauver-Harris) Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified at 21
U.S.C. §§ 321-381 (1988)).
27. Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: 7he 1962 Drug Amendments, 83
J. POL. ECON. 1049 (1973).
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to pay include applying hedonic price or wage methods to studies of averting
behavior, and studying the amount individuals actually pay for such quality
changes. 28 Barriers neighborhoods construct to mitigate the effects of highway
or airport noise illustrate the first method. One can assume that the benefits
of the noise reduction are at least the cost of the expenditure to avoid a given
quantity of noise, if marginal benefits equal marginal costs. Hedonic price or
wage methods attempt to evaluate the marginal value of quality improvements
in specific amenities. For instance, the value workers implicitly place on safety
is assumed to be the wage premium those working in more hazardous, though
otherwise identical, circumstances receive. Econometric analyses of the implicit
wage (or price) premiums can reveal the amount workers are willing to pay
for improved workplace safety and, in the aggregate, their willingness to pay
to prevent an expected fatality.29 Similarly, hedonic analysis of the price
differentials for different housing site locations based on variations in air
quality can reveal individuals' willingness to pay for cleaner air. Economists
have applied the technique in a number of instances including the valuation of
reducing crime, lowering highway or airport noise, cleaning up hazardous
waste sites, and other location-specific amenities.
Hedonic estimation procedures, while useful, also have drawbacks. The
basic problem with the approach is that it necessarily relies on very indirect
methods of estimation, which under certain circumstances lead to identification
problems.3" Completely specifying the relevant demand and supply character-
istics that determine where people choose to live is a daunting econometric task
open to serious questions of omitted variable bias. Moreover, problems of
multicollinearity frequently arise when estimating the value of improved
visibility and health as benefits of cleaner air." Further, in some
circumstances, people may not have complete information about certain risks,
such as those associated with particular jobs, hazardous waste sites, and air
pollutants. Despite these problems, rapid advances in this relatively new
28. Freeman, Methods for Assessing the Benefits of Environmental Programs, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS 223 (1985).
29. Most estimates of the implicit value of a statistical life lie in the range of $1.7 to $9.2 million,
with the most likely value towards the bottom of the range. See Fisher, Chestnet & Violette, The Value
of Reducing Risks of Death: A Note on New Evidence, 8 J. POL'Y ANAL. & MGMT. 88, 90 (1989) ($1.6
to $8.5 billion in 1986 dollars).
30. Identification problems occur in estimating a system of simultaneous equations where the data do
not allow a distinction between two equations. In such a case, the data make the equations seem as if they
were the same when, actually, their parameters are different. To avoid an identification problem, each
equation of the system must have variables that distinguish it from the other equations. See Rosen, Hedonic
Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82 J. POL. ECON. 34 (1974);
Brown & Rosen, On the Estimation of Structural Hedonic Price Models, 50 ECONOMETRICA 765 (1982).
Quigley provides one solution to these problems while maintaining the hedonic framework. See Quigley,
Nonlinear Budget Constraints and Consumer Demand: An Application to Public Programs for Residential
Housing, 12 J. URB. EcON. 177 (1982).
31. Multicollinearity means that one cannot separate the effects of two or more independent variables
because they are highly correlated with one another.
Vol. 8: 233, 1990
The Costs and Benefits of Regulation
technique promise improved empirical estimates of the benefits of commodi-
ties, such as clean air, that are not explicitly traded in the marketplace.
Other measures of the benefits of social regulation include travel cost
estimates of the value of cleaner water for fishing, boating, and swimming,
and estimates of the value of saving "statistical" lives by, for instance, requir-
ing safer automobiles. The travel cost method treats the costs individuals incur
in reaching recreation sites as surrogate prices. From these observed "prices,"
one generates site-specific demand curves, from which one calculates the
resulting welfare changes.32 The most widely accepted way of measuring the
value of risk changes utilizes the hedonic method described above, since
aggregation over enough individuals produces implicit values per statistical life
prolonged.33
e. Surveys
An alternative method for valuing environmental and natural resources is
to use survey data. "Contingent valuation" methods are survey techniques
designed to elicit information about what individuals are willing to pay (or
accept) for changes in the environment. For example, a respondent might be
asked how much she would be willing to pay in increased electricity rates for
a specified reduction in smog. Typically, the respondent would be shown a
picture of the environmental resource before and after, so that the nature of
the proposed change is clear.
A great deal of controversy has arisen over the application of contingent
valuation methods to particular cases. Although analysts currently use them
in a wide variety of cases involving damage to natural resources, these tech-
niques have a variety of problems. Researchers disagree over the meaningful-
ness of the estimates, particularly when resources are not traded regularly in
markets.34 Economists continue to use such techniques because there is no
obvious alternative for valuing resource damages in many situations."
32. See R. MITCHELL & R. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT
VALUATION METHOD 79-80 (1989) (discussion of travel-cost method).
33. For a recent estimate, see Moore & Viscusi, Doubling the Estimated Value of Life: Results Using
New Occupational Fatality Data, 7 J. POL'Y ANAL. & MGMT. 476, 476 (1988).
34. Although contingent valuation is particularly useful when markets do not regularly trade the
commodity to be valued (for example, wilderness areas), it suffers from the likely divergence between what
people choose to tell the interviewer and how they would behave under actual, rather than hypothetical,
conditions.
35. See R. MITCHELL & R. CARSON, supra note 32, at 1-2. See generally Carson & Navarro, Funda-
mental Issues in Natural Resource Damage Assessment, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 815 (1988) (interesting
perspective on politics driving preference for specific contingent valuation techniques).
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C. Economy-Wide Modeling of the Impacts of Regulation
Two general methods exist for evaluating the impacts of policy changes
on the economy. One involves macroeconomic models and the other involves
general equilibrium models.
Macroeconomic models typically combine a series of accounting relation-
ships, such as the relationship between savings and investment, with historical
relationships of performance in various sectors of the economy. While econo-
mists frequently use these models to make forecasts of output changes in
various sectors, they generally do not use them to assess changes in economic
efficiency.
In contrast, general equilibrium models are ideally suited to simulate and
measure changes in economic efficiency. This method has become increasingly
popular as a way of measuring the impact of policies and regulations on
consumer and producer behavior. These models typically examine a response
to a new policy, such as a change in regulation, under the assumption that
markets are perfectly competitive. One can link the effects of a regulation to
changes in output, employment, and in some cases welfare. One application
of particular interest is the Hazilla and Kopp general equilibrium analysis of
the costs of clean air and water regulations.36 Those authors find a large
disparity between the cost estimates reached using the expenditure approach
outlined above and their general equilibrium analysis. More recently, Jorgen-
son and Wilcoxen have implemented a general equilibrium model that attempts
to measure the long-run impact of environmental regulations on economic
growth."
Although general equilibrium models have several problems, including
substantial data requirements, their results suggest that partial equilibrium
approaches may fail to give an adequate picture of regulatory impacts in some
cases. Simply stated, the methodological issue boils down to defining the
conditions under which it is reasonable to assume away "second-order"
effects.3" These conditions vary across different industries and regulations.
For example, Hazilla and Kopp find that second-order effects are pronounced
in air and water regulation. 9 The impact of second-order effects has changed
with time, however. They find that in 1975 social costs were lower than EPA's
36. Hazilla & Kopp, Social Cost of Environmental Quality Regulations: A General Equilibrium
Analysis, 98 J. POL. EcON. 853 (1990).
37. Jorgenson & Wilcoxen, Environmental Regulation and U.S. Economic Growth, 21 RAND J. ECON.
314 (1990).
38. Second-order effects consist of price, input, and output decisions that a partial equilibrium model
typically omits. For example, if pollution raises the prices of consumption items, people may substitute
leisure for consumption of goods and services. In addition, those industries that incur the highest pollution
control costs would tend to experience decreases in employment, while industries with lower pollution
control costs would expand their employment.
39. Hazilla & Kopp, supra note 36, at 870.
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estimate of compliance costs, but subsequently increased above compliance
costs in the 1980s.4" They explain this result, in part, by asserting that pollu-
tion control regulation led people to substitute leisure for direct consumption,
so that output decreased over time.4' A similar study by Jorgenson and
Wilcoxen is consistent with their conclusions. Jorgenson and Wilcoxen find
that studies based on growth accounting are likely to underestimate the impact
of environmental regulations on economic growth because they ignore the
effect on investment.42
One of the principal arguments on behalf of general equilibrium models
is that they enable the analyst to develop a more realistic representation of how
the economy works. However, these models have their drawbacks, particularly
in assessing regulatory impacts. One problem with the modeling efforts to date
is that they rarely report sensitivities to input parameters. 43 A second problem
with the models is that they assume the economy is perfectly competitive.
Analysts could relax this assumption, but have not done so in actual policy
applications. A third serious problem with environmental applications is that
they do not take into account the benefits of environmental improvement. We
conjecture that including benefits could have a dramatic effect on parameters
such as economic growth and changes in welfare. A fourth problem with these
models relates to validation. For example, how can one be sure such models
are a valid representation of the economy? Validation is a problem inherent
in modeling any counterfactual situation; it is exacerbated, however, when
modeling becomes more complex. A final problem relates to the lack of
transparency of the models. Because such complex models are difficult to
understand, it is easy to imagine situations in which results are driven by
errors in the data or in the construction of the model itself.
In short, the application of general equilibrium models to regulatory prob-
lems is still in its infancy. At this stage, most analysts seem content to note
that the results obtained from these models often are different from those
obtained using partial equilibrium approaches. Indeed, some suggest that
general equilibrium results represent a more realistic simulation of the
economic impacts of particular policies. We believe that both partial and
general equilibrium models have important uses in policy applications and
should be viewed as complements rather than substitutes. Unfortunately, both
structural models have obvious deficiencies and there is no simple way of
40. Id. at 865.
41. Id. at 866-867.
42. Jorgenson & Wilcoxen, supra note 37, at 338.
43. Some studies include sensitivity analysis, but because of the complexity of the models, it is not
obvious that these sensitivities actually capture the limitations of the models to yield useful policy insights.
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determining which set of models provides a better estimate of regulatory
impacts."
D. Political Costs of Regulation and Deregulation
While the preceding models can estimate the benefits of economic deregula-
tion, they do not account for the political costs associated with establishing and
maintaining different regulatory regimes. A theory of the conditions under
which deregulation is likely to occur would be useful for estimating these
costs. However, no theory is widely accepted at present.4" Some theories treat
the government as a "black box" that redistributes wealth to the highest or
most effective bidder. McCormick has argued that in such situations, the gains
from deregulation may be relatively small.46 Other theories, based on the
behavior of legislators within well-defined political institutions, question such
simplistic views.47
Furthermore, it is difficult to include political costs when calculating the
total cost of regulation or deregulation. In principle, these costs should equal
the costs of shifting to and maintaining the new political equilibrium minus the
costs of maintaining the old political equilibrium, appropriately discounted.
Since one cannot observe these costs easily, it is not obvious whether this
calculation would yield a positive or negative number. The relative magnitude
of this number in comparison with the estimated gains from deregulation also
is uncertain. For the purpose of estimating costs and benefits of regulation,
we assume that these costs are negligible. That is, political deadweight costs
are comparable under different regulatory regimes.
44. A serious problem with these simulations is that they have no external source of validation.
Whether more complex models better reflect behavior in the "real world" is debatable, and depends on
the particular problem and the models used. See generally M. MORGAN & M. HENRION, UNCERTAINTY:
A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN QUANTITATIVE RISK AND POLICY ANALYSIS (1990).
45. See, e.g., Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1 (1989) [hereinafter BROOKINGS PAPERS];
Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 97 Q.J. ECON. 371
(1983). See generally Hahn, supra note 2.
46. McCormick, Shughart & Tollison, The Disinterest in Deregulation, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 1075
(1984). For a critique arguing that regulated firms do not necessarily minimize costs, see Frantz &
Naughton, A Note on the Disinterest in Deregulation, 1 J. REGULATORY ECON. 175 (1989).
47. See Noll, The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation: Comment, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS, supra note 45, at 48; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics
and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431
(1989).
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E. Selecting an Estimation Approach
The preceding discussion of estimation procedures suggests that there is
no dearth of tools for estimating regulatory impacts." In general, the appro-
priate tool will vary with the objective. In this Article, the objective is to
estimate the aggregate costs and benefits associated with selected regulatory
policies. In principle, a macroeconomic model or general equilibrium model
that attempts to sort out the influences of specific policies suffices. In practice,
modeling problems and data gaps impede the application of such models. The
best approach seems to be to cull the best estimates from the literature on the
microeconomic impacts of regulation. Accordingly, this Article generally
builds on the partial equilibrium framework.49
II. Towards a More Refined Estimate of Regulatory Costs and Benefits
Several studies have attempted to quantify the total costs of regulation.
Weidenbaum and DeFina, and Litan and Nordhaus add together the regulatory
cost estimates derived from numerous sources to produce an aggregate cost
of regulation."0 A problem arising in both of these studies is the definition
of social cost, which varies due to different definitions used in the original
empirical studies themselves. The primary difficulty lies in distinguishing
between economic costs (deadweight losses) and transfers.5 t Both studies
include in their estimates a mixture of costs and transfers, though Litan and
48. Moreover, this discussion has been limited to those tools that focus directly on changes in
economic efficiency. A related line of research attempts to examine how changes in regulation will affect
productivity. Productivity studies chart the difference between observed productivity changes over time
and those that would have occurred in the absence of one or more federal regulations. Denison estimates
that less than 16% of the 1973-75 productivity slowdown was due to regulation. E. DENISON, ACCOUNTING
FOR SLOWER ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1970's, at 3-4, 128-31 (1979). Other
studies reach similar conclusions, arguing that regulation had a relatively small impact on declining
productivity. E.g., Portney, The Macroeconomic Impacts of Federal Environmental Regulation, in
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 25 (H. Peskin ed. 1981). An exception is Gray,
The Cost of Regulation: OSHA, EPA, and the Productivity Slowdown, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 998 (1987),
which finds that OSHA and EPA regulations alone accounted for over 30% of the productivity slowdown
in the 1970s. Id. at 998.
Productivity studies suffer from a number of problems, such as their reliance on expenditure data and
an inability to specify the determinants of macroeconomic performance over time. Kopp & Smith,
Productivity Measurement and Environmental Regulation: An Engineering-Econometric Analysis, in
PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT N REGULATED INDUSTRIES 249, 257 (1981). Kopp and Smith further argue
that by failing to model correctly the subtle input substitution process involved in meeting regulations,
estimates such as Denison's, which rely on one or two specific factors, are biased downward (though the
magnitude of the bias is unknown). Id. at 250-51.
49. As general equilibrium models become more refined and provide more in-depth analyses of actual
policies, it may be feasible to combine the outputs of these models with those of partial equilibrium models
in order to measure overall regulatory costs.
50. M. WEIDENBAUM & R. DEFINA, supra note 11; R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 12.
51. Efficiency costs are real economic losses that one group suffers, yet another group cannot reclaim
as benefits. Transfer payments are a redistribution of benefits from one group to another that has no impact
on total economic output.
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Nordhaus claim that their total reflects "deadweight or efficiency
costs. 5 2 For example, in reporting estimates of the cost of trucking regula-
tion, they mix substantial transfer payments with welfare costs. 5 3 Weiden-
baum and DeFina do acknowledge that their costs include both transfers and
efficiency costs; nevertheless, the proper interpretation of their estimate is
unclear.54 While we have relied on the source material used for these studies,
we have improved upon them by separating, where possible, the efficiency
losses from transfers. We provide two estimates of regulatory costs, one
identifying changes in economic efficiency and the other including the more
politically relevant transfer payments.
Another problem with previous compilations of regulatory costs is that they
do not consider benefits that may be associated with regulatory policies. While
most traditional economic regulations do not yield net economic benefits (only
transfers and costs), most social regulations do yield benefits. Adding the costs
of social and economic regulation without including benefits produces an
inaccurate picture of the overall impact of regulation. The true magnitude of
the net regulatory burden never emerges. While estimating the benefits of
environmental, health, and safety regulation is not straightforward, it is not
informative to exclude them from a discussion of regulatory costs and bene-
fits. In sum, economic regulation, properly measured, represents a net cost
to society; social regulation may represent either a net cost or a net benefit.
A. Methodology
Estimating the costs and benefits of regulation requires a working definition
of regulation itself. Scholars have grappled with this problem for some time
with only limited success, and we do not intend to resolve the debate here.55
Instead, we focus on the impacts of policies that previous studies have tended
to group under the category of administrative regulation-more specifically,
federal regulation. In addition, we choose to focus on economic rather than
administrative budgetary costs, largely because we view the latter as only
tangentially related to regulation's total impact on the economy.56
52. R. LrrAN & W. NORDIIAuS, supra note 12, at 189.
53. Id. at 186. If the authors had included the recipients of the transfers as beneficiaries of regulation,
this mixture would not have posed a problem. In both studies, however, the authors ignore the benefits
of regulation.
54. M. WEIDENBAUM.& R. DEFINA, supra note 11, at 8.
55. See R. NOLL, WHAT is REGULATION? (California Institute of Technology Social Science Working
Paper No. 324, 1980); Stigler, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview: Comment, in STUDIES,
supra note 17, at 73.
56. An agency's budget reveals little about its effect on the economy. Indeed, the relatively small
budgets of some regulatory agencies belie their large impact on the economy.
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Our list of federal regulatory activities builds on the work of Litan and
Nordhaus, and of Weidenbaum and DeFina."7 As with these two studies, we
find that some analyses separate costs and transfers, while others include only
one or the other. We also add four other areas of regulation that seem appro-
priate and that include significant economic impacts: trade barriers, agricultural
price supports, postal rates, and telecommunications.
In order to construct estimates of each type of cost, where necessary we
approximate transfers (or efficiency costs) based on available estimates of the
ratio of transfers to deadweight costs for other regulations. This procedure,
while admittedly crude, is a reasonable approach given the data limitations.
For the regulations this study examines, the ratio of transfers to efficiency
costs ranges from 2:1 to 12:1. We estimate that the ratio is three dollars of
transfers for every dollar of efficiency costs."
Table 1 presents estimates both of the costs of economic regulation, defined
as efficiency losses, and of the transfers resulting from economic regulation.59
The efficiency losses are measured relative to a first-best outcome within a
given sector. In some cases, such an outcome may not be attainable even in
theory because the structure of an industry does not allow a sustainable,
efficient equilibrium to emerge.6" The first-best benchmark tends to overstate
the actual costs of economic regulation. The degree of overestimation is
"small," however, since appropriate policies could capture most of the
efficiency gains. Moreover, ex ante studies of regulatory change frequently
do not estimate adequately the impact of regulation on technological innova-
tion. We suspect that this bias leads to a significant understatement of the
benefits from more efficient policies in a number of areas, such as telecommu-
nications and shipping, where improved regulation may lead to rapid techno-
logical advances.
Our "bottom line" estimate of the net costs of economic regulation is
roughly $46 billion, as the total in Table 1 shows. Annual transfer payments,
which we estimate to be between $172.1 and $209.5 billion, are much higher.
These figures differ considerably from previous regulatory cost estimates.
Weidenbaum and DeFina estimate costs at $137.0 billion,6' while Litan and
57. R. LrrAN & W. NoRDHAus, supra note 12; M. WEIDENBAUM & R. DEFINA, supra note 11.
58. Sensitivity analyses using other ratio estimates between 2:1 and 5:1 produced little overall variation
in regulatory costs (less than $1 billion in efficiency costs). Most studies estimate efficiency costs rather
than transfers. Since efficiency costs are "known" for most studies employed here, in general we use the
ratios solely to estimate transfers. The small differences in the costs arise when we know only transfers
and derive efficiency costs instead. The ratio of 3:1 reflects the general tendency of all industries for which
both transfers and efficiency costs are known, and, if anything, may err on the conservative side.
59. The Appendix provides a more detailed specification of the derivation of the figures in Table 1.
See infra notes 109-211 and accompanying text.
60. Panzar & Willig, Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly, 8 BELL J. ECON. 1, 1-2
(1977).
61. M. WEIDENBAUM & R. DEFINA, supra note 11, at 3 ($66.1 billion in 1976 dollars).
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Nordhaus's estimate ranges between $67.7 and $176.9 billion for the costs of
economic regulation alone.62 Our estimates diverge for several reasons. First,
both Weidenbaum and DeFina, and Litan and Nordhaus estimate the cost of
regulation at its height in the late 1970s, while our analysis follows significant
deregulatory measures. Second, our analysis attempts to separate efficiency
costs from transfers more carefully. Finally, our analysis incorporates several
additional and significant regulations that the others chose to exclude, such as
agricultural price supports, trade barriers, postal rate regulation, and telecom-
munications regulation. Indeed, when we omit these regulations from our list,
the efficiency costs of the remaining regulations fall to between $7.2 and $8.5
billion.
B. Difficulties and Omissions in Assessing Economic Regulation
Table 1 does not indicate the significant efficiency gains since 1977, which
resulted primarily from the deregulation of the transportation and energy
sectors. The principal industries deregulated in the late 1970s (airlines, truck-
ing, railroads, oil, and natural gas) accounted for one-half the efficiency cost
of economic regulation in 1977, or about roughly $36 billion, according to our
calculations.63 With many of the inefficient regulations dismantled, the airline
market experienced efficiency gains of $15.6 billion, trucking between $1.5
and $5.0 billion, rail $2.8 billion, natural gas about $5.0 billion, and oil from
$5.7 to $11.5 billion.64 Adding Crandall's estimate of about $3.0 billion saved
by the limited telecommunications deregulation in 198265 produces total
annual deregulatory savings of between $33.6 and $42.9 billion. Although
further efficiency gains in these sectors are still possible (especially for air,
rail, natural gas, and telecommunications), deregulators have made significant
strides to reduce the overall impact of economic regulation on the economy.
62. R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 12, at 23 ($34.7 to $90.6 billion in 1977 dollars). Our
figures use Litan and Nordhaus's, and Weidenbaum and DeFina's estimated costs of both economic and
social regulation. However, because we conclude below that the benefits of the social regulations examined
are roughly equivalent to the costs, the $46 billion figure represents the total net cost of the regulations
our study assesses. This Article directly parallels earlier studies.
63. According to Litan and Nordhaus, the figure was 78% of total economic regulation in 1977. R.
LrrAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 12, at 23. Our inclusion of other significant regulations, such as trade
barriers and agricultural price supports that are not part of Litan and Nordhaus's analysis, explains most
of this discrepancy.
64. The Appendix provides sources for each of these estimates. See infra notes 126-33, 157-69, 187-
202, and accompanying text.
65. Telephone interview with Robert Crandall, Senior Economist, Brookings Institution (Dec. 10,
1990) [hereinafter Interview with Crandall]. Crandall estimates that the gains from repricing interstate and
local services range from $0.7 to $1.9 billion for 1988. An upper bound on productivity gains resulting
from greater interstate competition is $3.5 billion for 1988. Overall efficiency gains are in the neighborhood
of $3.0 billion.
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Table 1
Annual Costs of Economic Regulation in 1988










































7.7 Morrison & Winston (1986,
1989)
6.8' Winston (1985)
4-12 President's Commission on
Privatization (1988)
0.9-3.5 Ippolito & Masson; Buxton
& Hammond (reported in
MacAvoy (1977))
5.0 Loury (1983)
0.6-0.9' Litan & Nordhaus (1983)
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. Figures estimated using 3:1 ratio of transfers to erficiency costs. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
a Indicates primary source of estimate; the Appendix contains details. See infra notes 109-211 and accompanying text,
* Cost of natural gas regulation expected to approach cero as all price controls are lifted.
If estimate is zero, federal regulation is assumed to be negligible.
Regulated Sector
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Table 1 does not quantify the costs in some important economic sectors
where regulatory costs could be significant, most notably electric utilities and
banking, because estimates of the costs in these areas are not readily available.
In the case of electric utilities more widespread application of marginal cost
pricing and greater competition in the market for producing power could yield
significant gains.66 In addition, promoting easier access to transmission facili-
ties along with greater flexibility in pricing would provide further gains. The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Congress are considering a series
of regulatory changes that would encourage greater competition in the market
for producing power, which could yield significant gains for consumers and
industry.67
Two problems arise in estimating these gains. The first involves obtaining
reliable estimates of demand behavior. Estimates of how consumers and
industry will change their purchases as a result of significant changes in prices
generally are very crude. A second problem stems from the difficulty in
specifying how a change in a particular policy would affect the market for
supplying electricity. In virtually all cases, the implementation of the policy
is critical. For example, regulators requiring utilities to pay too high a price
for power generated from other sources could induce inefficiencies. Similarly,
if regulators provide the wrong price signals for conservation, consumers and
industry might over- or under-conserve electricity.68
Economists estimating- the costs and benefits of banking regulation also
encounter formidable problems, the most important of which is identifying a
reasonable benchmark with which to compare the current system. Unfortunate-
ly, such a counterfactual does not exist.
The government has several opportunities to enhance the efficiency of the
banking industry by allowing for economies of scope (for example, in under-
writing securities) and by implementing more responsible regulation that
provides consumers and businesses with greater incentives to monitor the
health of financial institutions.69 If implemented successfully, the legislative
package addressing the savings and loan financial problems7" could save a
significant amount of money.7 1
66. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 1, at 207-11.
67. Id. at 209.
68. See Cicchetti & Hogan, Including Unbundled Demand-side Options in Electric Utility Bidding
Programs, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 8, 1989, at 9.
69. Hahn, supra note 2, at 186-95.
70. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103
Stat. 183 (1989).
71. See, e.g., Benston & Kaufman, Understanding the Savings-and-Loan Debacle, 99 PUB. INTEREST
79 (1990).
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C. Estimates of the Costs and Benefits of Social Regulation
Unlike economic regulation, where the benefits are thought to be negligible
in most cases, 72 social regulation has the potential to confer significant bene-
fits. Because social regulation can address specific "market failures," it may
provide net benefits to society. While potentially beneficial, such regulation
also has costs. Furthermore, the extent to which net benefits accrue will
depend on how the government actually implements programs designed to
address specific social problems, such as pollution, AIDS, or crime.
Table 2 shows that the cost estimate for social regulation lies within the
range of the regulatory benefit estimates.73 We estimate social regulatory
costs to lie between $78.0 and $107.1 billion, while benefits span an even
larger range from $41.9 to $181.5 billion per year. Because of the uncertainty
of the estimates, the net effect of social regulation may be between negative
$65.2 billion (net cost) and $103.5 billion (net benefit). Our "best guess" is
that the costs and benefits of social regulations included in this study are
roughly comparable.74
Adding the social and economic regulatory net costs yields an overall
estimate of the quantitative effects of regulation of between a net cost of
$111.7 billion and a net benefit of $58.2 billion. Since our "best guess" is that
the net benefits of social regulation are less than $2 billion, the net costs of
all regulations are the costs of economic regulation, minus the net benefits of
social regulation. We estimate the annual net costs of all regulations to be
roughly $44 billion, less than one percent of the Gross National Product.
One important aspect of environmental regulation that could easily dwarf
the estimates contained in Table 2 relates to the disposal of hazardous wastes.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that in 1983, industrial expenditures
for complying with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976"5
standards (by disposing of hazardous waste) totaled $7.1 billion.76 Cleaning
up abandoned waste sites under EPA's Superfund77 program will entail con-
72. Two possible exceptions arise in the area of natural monopoly and antitrust, both of which can,
in theory, lead to efficiency gains under particular circumstances.
73. The Appendix provides a more detailed specification of the derivation of the figures in Table 2.
See infra notes 212-65 and accompanying text.
74. We derive our "best guess" using Freeman's "best guess" for environmental benefits of $58.4
billion. Freeman, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 97, 123
(P. Portney ed. 1990) [hereinafter PUBLIC POLICIES]; Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in id. at 28, 57 ($51.3
billion in 1984 dollars). Adding this amount to the midpoint of the highway safety benefits, and comparing
with the midpoint of the cost figures, produces a small net benefit of $1.4 billion. Although several of the
cost estimates are upper bounds, we conclude that net benefits of social regulation are positive but small.
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (1988).
76. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF., HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT (1985), reported in Dower,
Hazardous Wastes, in PUBLIC POLICIES, supra note 74, at 178 ($6 billion in 1983 dollars).
77. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601
(1989).
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siderable additional costs. For example, the Office of Technology Assessment
estimates that the undiscounted costs associated with cleaning up and removing
hazardous wastes could reach $500 billion.78 This amount represents a very
crude estimate of costs over the next few decades. We do not include estimates
of the costs and benefits of such policies in part because most of these costs
will be borne in the future, and the benefits are highly uncertain.79
Although the benefits of social regulation may equal or exceed its costs,
the potential exists for far greater efficiency improvements since it is unlikely
that marginal benefits equal marginal costs. For example, introducing market-
able air pollution permits could yield significant improvements in air quality
while reducing overall control costs.8" Other areas for potential efficiency
gains include drug, pesticide, and occupational safety regulation.
D. Uncertainties in Regulatory Costs and Benefits
Current applied benefits estimation is as much an art as a science due to
imperfect methodology and insufficient data. Assessing what people are willing
to pay for cleaner air or water, or increased safety, is difficult because
typically one must use indirect techniques to infer such information.8 In most
cases, benefit estimates of social regulations probably are best viewed as
"guesstimates."
In general, cost estimates are likely to be more precise because one can
characterize production technologies more easily than changes in demand. For
example, one would expect the range of uncertainty around cost estimates to
78. OFF. OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMING CLEAN: SUPERFUND PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED
194 (1989).
79. We are fairly certain that the costs of many of these regulations will be very high. The benefits
are less clear, but often appear to be relatively small when measured in terms of cost per cancer case
avoided. For example, an analysis of a proposal to broaden the scope of hazardous waste regulation by
regulating more chemicals suggested a cost per cancer case avoided of at least $16 to $67 million. ECON.
ANAL. STAFF, OFF. OF SOLID WASTE; U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, TOXICITY CHARACTERISTIC
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, FINAL REPORT ES-10, ES-15 (1990) (we compute the range by dividing
annual compliance cost by annual number of cancer risk reductions). An analysis of a draft regulation for
municipal solid waste landfills noted that the cost per cancer avoided ranged from $0.3 to $2.7 billion per
cancer case avoided. ECON. ANAL. STAFF, OFF. OF SOLID WASTE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
DRAFT REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REVISIONS TO SUBTITLE D CRITERIA FOR MUNICI-
PAL SOLID WASTE LANDFILLS 29 (1988). These numbers are more than an order of magnitude higher than
most estimates of the implied valuation of a statistical life based on individuals' actual risk tradeoff
decisions. For discussion, see supra note 29. The EPA's best estimate of the risks from hazardous waste
is that they are relatively low in comparison with other environmental risks, but the uncertainties around
the risk estimates are large. See generally OFF. OF POL'Y ANAL. & OFF. OF POL'Y, PLAN., & EVALUA-
TION, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BuSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS: OVERVIEW REPORT (1987).
80. Hahn & Noll, Designing a Marker for Tradeable Permits, in REFORM OF ECONOMIC REGULATION
119, 121 (W. Magat ed. 1982).
81. Moreover, often there is a gulf between how the public ranks various risks and how experts see
these risks. See ScI. ADVISORY BD., U.S. ENVIL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING
PRIORITIS AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 12 (1990).
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be narrower than the range of uncertainty around the benefits associated with
reducing acid rain. There is greater certainty in estimating pollution abatement
costs, such as the cost of switching to cleaner fuels and the cost of scrubbers,
than in estimating the monetary value of changes in morbidity, mortality,
ecological systems, and visibility, because utility gains are more difficult to
monetize than capital and operating costs. In the case of air pollution, not only
is the evidence linking pollutants to health disorders limited, but the value
individuals place on improved health is difficult to measure as well.
Nevertheless, significant uncertainties affect most cost estimates. These
uncertainties arise in predicting how government will implement specific
policies and how industry will respond. The different analyses of transportation
deregulation provide an example. In the cases of trucks, airlines, and railroads,
the ex ante analyses of projected savings from deregulation tended to be
significantly lower than those estimates completed after the implementation of
reforms. The differences, which in some cases reach orders of magnitude, cast
serious doubt on our ability to assess changes in regulatory costs resulting from
major deregulatory initiatives. As we noted earlier, incorrect specifications of
changes in technology and service explain part of the downward bias in these
ex ante estimates.
Studies of the benefits associated with trucking deregulation provide esti-
mates that vary by an order of magnitude. Research examining the trucking
industry in the period prior to deregulation yields estimates of efficiency costs
in the range of $1.5 to $4.9 billion, resulting from pricing above marginal
cost. Joskow and Rose update Moore's 1975 estimate and find regulatory costs
(including transfers) to be $4.9 billion.82 Moore's 1978 estimate places the
total costs (including transfers) at around $8.2 billion.83 After the subsequent
partial deregulation of trucking, however, at least one study reached very
different conclusions as to the extent of efficiency costs prior to deregulation.
Using "logistics costs" estimates (such as personnel and distribution costs)
from Delaney, Owen attributes cost reductions on the order of $40.5 to $65.5
billion to trucking deregulation.84
Delaney's (and therefore Owen's) estimates may be suspect for several
reasons, however. First, Delaney uses highly aggregated data to obtain his
estimates, which prohibits a more detailed understanding of input substitu-
tions." Second, as Barnekov notes, some of the reduction in processing costs
is related less to rail deregulation than to improved management techniques,
82. Joskow & Rose, supra note 16, at 1481 ($4.5 billion in 1986 dollars).
83. Moore, The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation, 21 J.L. & EcON. 327, 342 (1978) ($2.5 to $3.3
billion in 1972 dollars).
84. D. OWEN, DEREGULATION IN THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY 1 (Federal Trade Commission, 1988)
($39 to $63 billion in 1987 dollars).
85. Delaney, Managerial and Financial Challenges Facing Transport Leaders, 40 TRANSP. Q. 29
(1986).
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Table 2
Annual Costs and Benefits of Social Regulation in 1988
(in Billions of 1988 Dollars)
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communication, and data processing.8 6 Third, there is no model against which
to judge the accuracy of Delaney's calculations. Finally, partial equilibrium
analyses that attempt to measure the impact of trucking deregulation should
reveal a significant portion of the "logistics cost" estimates. That Delaney's
numbers are an order of magnitude larger than the microeconomic studies
suggests either that Delaney is in error or the partial equilibrium estimates are
seriously flawed.
Estimates of the economic impact of airline deregulation also span a wide
range. We estimate the annual efficiency costs for the period prior to deregula-
tion to be $0.7 to $2.9 billion.87 Since deregulation in 1978, at least two
studies have estimated that the benefits of deregulation were far greater than
previously estimated regulatory costs. Morrison and Winston, using a logit
travel demand model, find that the benefits of airline deregulation were $15.6
billion, without any significant losses to specific groups. 8 They add that their
calculations most likely understate overall benefits.8 9 Caves estimates that
productivity gains in the airline industry after deregulation lowered airline unit
costs by 10%, saving over $4.8 billion in 1983 alone.90 This finding is consis-
tent with the Morrison and Winston estimate.
While airlines are now free to enter particular markets and set fares on
particular flights, the government still manages the air traffic control system
and has a dramatic impact on the management of airports. Several authors have
argued that restructuring the "supply-side" of air transport could result in
substantial efficiency gains.91 Morrison and Winston estimate efficiency gains
of over $11 billion from pricing airport slots efficiently and expanding the
number (supply) of airports.92
Estimates of the impact of railroad regulation differ by over two orders of
magnitude. Prior to partial deregulation, Winston estimated the annual welfare
loss to be approximately $6.8 billion.93 Since partial deregulation, two studies
have attempted to estimate the resulting benefits. Using a statistical analysis
86. Barnekov, Trucking, U.S. Industrial Outlook, 52 TRANsP. SERVICES 4, 6 (1989).
87. These cost estimates assume that previous estimates, which count both efficiency costs and
transfers, total between $2.7 and $11.7 billion (between $1.4 and $6.0 billion in 1977 dollars). See R.
LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 12, at 23. The efficiency cost estimate of $0.7-2.9 billion employs
the previous assumption of three dollars of transfers for every dollar of efficiency costs.
88. S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, supra note 14, at 51 ($8 billion in 1977 dollars).
89. Id. at 52.
90. Caves, Christensen, Tretheway & Windle, An Assessment of the Efficiency Effects of U.S. Airline
Deregulation via an International Comparison, in PUBLIC REGULATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITU-
TIONS AND POLICIES 285, 286 (E. Bailey ed. 1987) [hereinafter PUBLIC REGULATION] ($4.0 billion in 1983
dollars).
91. Hahn & Kroszner, The Mismanagement of Air Transport: A Supply-Side Analysis, 95 PUB.
INTEREST 100 (1989).
92. Morrison & Winston, Enhancing the Performance of the Deregulated Air Transportation System,
in BROOKINGS PAPERS, supra note 45, at 61, 93.
93. Winston, Conceptual Developments in the Economics of Transportation: An Interpretive Survey,
23 J. ECON. Lrr. 57, 84 (1985) ($2.5 billion in 1977 dollars).
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of the effects of deregulation on the average revenue per ton-mile for railroads,
Boyer finds that the annual cost of regulating railroads was only $102 million,
far below previous estimates."' However, Barnekov and Kleit question the
specification of Boyer's model.9" Implementing their new model using
Boyer's data, Barnekov and Kleit find that deregulation has resulted in efficien-
cy gains of between $9.7 and $16.9 billion annually.9"
A number of possible explanations arise for the differences between ex ante
and expost regulatory cost estimates. In some cases, such as airline deregula-
tion, it is difficult to control for changes in product quality or technology.
Moreover, specification of demand often is problematic, particularly when
there are numerous substitution possibilities and innovation is difficult to
predict.
In estimating the costs of social regulation, a key issue relates to how a
particular program will be implemented. For example, consider the case of the
acid rain regulations in the new Clean Air Act Amendments,97 which allow
for the formation of a market in emission permits to reduce sulfur oxide
emissions by ten million tons. If this program is successfully implemented, it
could save as much as $13 billion over traditional command-and-control
regulation, which requires power plants to use particular pollution control
technologies, such as scrubbing." Unfortunately, it is difficult to know how
the program will be implemented, and whether these efficiency gains will
indeed be realized.
The results of these analyses suggest not only that the methods used to
measure the impact of regulation and deregulation may be suspect, but that our
ability to predict the costs and benefits of specific regulatory changes is limited
as well. The cost and benefit estimates required for all new major federal
regulations99 probably are best viewed as order of magnitude approximations
of the actual impact of regulation on the economy.
94. Boyer, supra note 18, at 415 ($93 million in 1985 dollars).
95. C. BARNEKOV & A. KLEIr, THE COSTS OF RAILROAD REGULATION: A FURTHER ANALYSIS 1-5
(Federal Trade Commission Working Paper No. 164, 1988).
96. Id. at 1 (between $9.0 and $15.0 billion in 1986 dollars). There are a number of problems both
in specifying the structural model and in obtaining data adequate to estimate the economic impacts of
regulation. Problems in structural models include accounting for variations in product quality before and
after deregulation, specifying the time period over which deregulation occurred, and ensuring that "explana-
tory" variables are not themselves endogenous to the process of deregulation. Id. at 3-4.
97. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1991).
98. Hahn, Last Gasp for Bush Clean Air Reforms, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1989, at A30, col. 3.
99. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1990); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. § 323
(1990).
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Conclusion
In a $5 trillion plus economy, potential regulatory gains of $44 billion may
seem like small change. In fact, the number is misleading for three reasons.
First, it fails to capture the adverse impacts that many forms of government
regulation have on innovation. Such regulation has the potential to be most
onerous in areas where technology is changing rapidly, such as telecommunica-
tions and pollution control. Second, the number does not capture the trend
towards increased use of social regulation, which we believe could place a
significant drag on the economy in the years to come. Third, since marginal
costs exceed marginal benefits for many social regulations, significant savings
are available here as well. A more realistic assessment of the costs of regula-
tion would require explicit consideration of these omissions.
Three tasks are critical to developing sound regulatory policy. The first,
discussed above, is evaluating the costs and benefits of proposed regulatory
changes. As George Stigler noted in his more optimistic days, there is a need
to articulate carefully the impact of regulatory policies so that decision makers
will choose more wisely;"°' Of course, as an older and wiser Stigler
observed, there are limitations to the impact of such analysis.'01 Politicians
will not necessarily embrace a program on efficiency grounds since they, like
others, may be driven by narrower pursuits-such as survival within the
political arena.'0 2 Nonetheless, the information based upon which politicians
make regulatory decisions is extremely limited. We believe that improving and
disseminating better information is likely to induce decision-makers to scruti-
nize the costs and benefits of regulation more carefully. We hope that this
increased care will lead to more efficient decisions.1
0 3
The second task critical to the development of sound regulatory policy is
designing institutions that promote more effective regulation. Over the last
fifteen years, the Executive Branch has begun to experiment with a variety of
oversight institutions, such as the Regulatory Analysis Review Group in the
Carter Administration, and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
within the Office of Management and Budget. Economists have conducted
100. Stigler, The Economist and the State, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1965).
101. Stigler, Economists and Public Policy, REGULATION, May - June 1982, at 13.
102. Several scholars have highlighted the importance of political and economic forces in understanding
regulatory policies and the limitations of regulatory reform efforts. For an early, insightful treatment, see
R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL PROPOSALS (Studies in the
Regulation of Economic Activity, 1971).
103. For a formal analysis of the impact of cost-benefit analysis on project funding decisions at the
Army Corps of Engineers, see J. Hird, The Use and Quality of Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Federal
Government, ch. 4 (Dec. 1988) (Ph.D. dissertation) (available in Main Library, U. Calif. at Berkeley);
Hird, The Political Economy of Pork: Project Selection at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 85 AM. POL.
Scl. REV. (forthcoming June 1991).
104. For a review of Presidential initiatives to control regulatory spending, see G. EADS & M. FIX,
RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY DILEMMA (1984).
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surprisingly little research on the impact of these institutions, in part because
their impact is difficult to measure.05 More research is necessary to evaluate
whether and how these institutions actually affect regulatory policy. At this
point, it is unclear exactly what kind of arrangement within the Executive
Branch would be most likely to promote regulations that are more economically
efficient.
The third task critical to the development of sound regulatory policy is the
actual design of specific policies. Social scientists and lawyers have an impor-
tant role to play not only in evaluating policies, but also in designing them.
Ideas matter-particularly ideas that address the concerns of powerful interest
groups while enhancing efficiency. In order to increase the likelihood that
policy-makers seriously consider these ideas, academicians and policy entrepre-
neurs must become more engaged in the details of implementing these ideas,
as they did with airline deregulation and with the implementation of markets
in emissions rights for controlling acid rain.
Economists have tended to focus their research on assessing the impact of
"large" regulatory changes, such as the movement towards deregulation in-the
transportation industry. To complement these efforts, it is necessary to assess
more carefully the thousands of individual regulations, both large and small,
that collectively probably impose significant costs and may confer significant
benefits as well. These regulations would include state initiatives, such as
California's Proposition 65,106 as well as federal initiatives ranging from
OSHA regulations on recordkeeping requirements in the construction indus-
try"' to proposed EPA regulations governing the recycling of municipal
waste. 08 The costs of these types of initiatives, taken together, may be of
the same order of magnitude as the costs of major regulatory policies.
Given the importance of regulation in the U.S. economy, it is surprising
how little attention is given to its aggregate impact. The absence of scholarly
interest undoubtedly stems partly from the immensity of the task and the dearth
of tools that are available. Nevertheless, its continued importance indicates that
a better understanding of regulation and regulatory institutions is crucial to
improving the decision-making process. This Article represents a modest step
towards that end.
105. See Hahn, supra note 2, at 221-27.
106. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
25,249.5-.13 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990). See Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food Cancer Risk
Warnings on Consumers, 43 FOOD & DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 283 (1988).
107. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1926.550(b)(2), 1926.552(c)(15), 1926.903(e) (1990). For background, see 52
Fed. Reg. 36,378 (1987).
108. 16 C.F.R. § 1700.14(a)(7) (1990).
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Appendix: Description of Industry Regulatory Analyses
This Appendix provides a review of the studies used to derive the estimates
in the body of the Article. The first Part of the Appendix examines studies that
estimate the costs of economic regulation; the second Part reviews studies that
estimate both the costs and benefits of social regulation.
Al. The Costs of Economic Regulation
International Trade Barriers
Hufbauer estimates the economic effects of trade restraints by using partial
equilibrium static analysis to determine both welfare costs and transfers for
thirty-one industries.'°9 The study finds that trade restraints cost consumers
$110.6 billion annually,"o net producers $85.6 billion per year,11"' benefit
foreigners $12.1 billion,11 2 and yield tariff revenues of $10.5 billion." 3
Efficiency costs for the thirty-one industries total $17.3 billion. 1 4 Total
transfer payments are $85.6 to $110.6 billion, over five times the efficiency
costs." 5
Telecommunications
Griffin estimates a welfare loss of $2.4 to $3.3 billion per year due'to
subsidizing local telephone service from long-distance service."16 Wenders
estimates the annual welfare loss in U.S. toll markets at $13.1 billion, split
about evenly between interstate and intrastate service. "' Wenders assumes
that marginal-cost pricing is attainable and analyzes the difference between
marginal-cost prices and existing prices. In addition, citing the results of
another study, Wenders calculates that uneconomic pricing in local usage
markets imposes a welfare loss of $839 million annually because the subscriber
is charged a flat access fee, with usage sold at zero marginal cost."' Further,
Wenders calculates welfare losses in access markets of nearly $123 million per
109. G. HUFBAUER, D. BERLINER & K. ELLIOT, TRADE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: 31
CASE STUDIES (1986).
110. Id. at 15 ($100.6 billion in 1985 dollars).
111. Id. ($77.9 billion in 1985 dollars).
112. Id. ($11.0 billion in 1985 dollars).
113. Id. ($9.6 billion in 1985 dollars).
114. Id. ($15.8 billion in 1985 dollars).
115. Id. ($77.9 to $93.7 billion in 1985 dollars).
116. Griffin, The Welfare Implications of Externalities and Price Elasticities for Telecommunications
Pricing, 64 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 59 (1982), reported in J. WENDERS, THE ECONOMICS OF TELECOM-
MUNICATONS: THEORY AND POLICY 83 (1987) ($1.1 to $1.5 billion in 1975 dollars).
117. J. WENDERS, supra note 116, at 85 ($10.7 billion in 1982 dollars).
118. Id. at 86 ($685 million in 1982 dollars).
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year.119 Using Wenders' results, we estimate the total annual welfare cost
of inefficient telephone pricing to be nearly $14.1 billion.
Crandall correctly points out that Wenders' estimate is an upper bound for
two reasons. 20 First, Wenders assumes that marginal cost pricing is attain-
able in every market in the absence of regulatory controls. Second, marginal-
cost pricing in both the access and long-distance markets is unlikely to result
in full cost recovery. Crandall estimates the gains from repricing interstate and
local services to range from $0.7 to $1.4 billion dollars for 1988. A subscriber
line charge reflecting annual costs would yield efficiency gains between $1.0
and $3.1 billion for 1988.121
Agricultural Price Supports
The estimates of the economic effects of agricultural price supports draw
on the work of Gardner.122 Using partial equilibrium estimates of supply and
demand elasticities for a number of crops, Gardner calculates welfare costs
as well as transfer payments. His results show that consumers lose $5.1 billion
while taxpayers forfeit another $18.5 billion." Producers gain $17.2 billion,
resulting in a net economic cost of $6.3 billion annually. '24 Adding the $417
million annual budget of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation
Service (an agency Gardner claims would not be necessary without agricultural
price supports)'25 produces a total welfare cost of $6.7 billion per year. Total
transfer payments approximate $18.4 billion, nearly three times the welfare
loss.
Airline
Congress enacted significant changes in 1978 when it deregulated commer-
cial air carriers. Deregulation resulted in generally lower fares and higher
service quality as measured by frequency of service. Morrison and Winston
estimate that deregulation yielded efficiency gains on the order of $15.6
billion. 126
These ex post estimates are significantly higher than previous ex ante
estimates of the efficiency costs of airline regulation. Litan and Nordhaus,
119. Id. at 87 ($100 million in 1982 dollars).
120. Interview with Crandall, supra note 65.
121. Id.
122. B. GARDNER, PROTECTION OF U.S. AGRICULTURE: WHY, How, AND WHO LOSES? (Univ. of
Maryland Dept. of Agricultural & Resource Economics Working Paper No. 87-15, 1987).
123. Id. at 55 ($4.8 billion and $17.7 billion in 1987 dollars).
124. Id. ($16.5 billion and $6.0 billion in 1987 dollars).
125. Id. at 56 ($400 million in 1987 dollars).
126. S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, supra note 14, at 51 ($8.0 billion in 1977 dollars).
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using the results of an earlier study,' 27 estimate costs of between $2.7 and
$11.7 billion for airline regulation.'28 However, these costs represent the
difference between full-cost fares and the lowest feasible aggregate costs.
Consequently, one must regard a large portion of this estimate as transfers to
firms and labor, not as efficiency costs. Posner, whose study provides
unusually high ex ante estimates of static deadweight or efficiency costs of
various government regulations, estimates the annual social cost of airline
regulation at between 19% and 20% of industry revenues, or $5.7 billion in
1978. 129
Despite large savings from airline deregulation, significant inefficiencies
remain. Morrison and Winston estimate that inefficient pricing of existing
airport slots now imposes efficiency costs of $3.8 billion. '30 They also calcu-
late that making investment in airports more efficient would add another $7.2
billion in gains.' In addition, deregulating international airline markets
could yield significant efficiency gains.13 2
Morrison and Winston's combined calculations show that the cost of airline
regulation (not including airport investment inefficiencies) was $19.4 billion
in 1977,33 significantly higher than contemporary estimates.
Rail
A number of studies have estimated the effects of regulating railroads.
Winston reports a consensus of a $2.0 billion annual cost of surface rate
regulation,'34 and roughly $4.9 billion for excess capacity costs. '
Applying the estimated ratio of transfers to efficiency costs of 3:1 "' to
rail regulation produces a transfer payment estimate of roughly $20.6 billion.
Moore estimates that as a result of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980,137 approxi-
mately two-thirds of the rail market has been deregulated."'3 ICC regulation
still remains, however, for areas where railroads exercise "market domi-
127. G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY
AND POLiCY (1974).
128. R. LrrAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 12, at 23 (between $1.4 and $6.0 billion in 1977 dollars).
129. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 818 (1975) ($3.2
billion in 1978 dollars).
130. Morrison & Winston, supra note 92, at 93.
131. Id. We do not attribute inefficient investment in airports to federal regulation.
132. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 1, at 207.
133. Morrison & Winston, supra note 92, at 93.
134. Winston, supra note 93, at 83 ($1.0 billion in 1977 dollars).
135. Id. at 84 ($2.5 billion in 1977 dollars).
136. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
137. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 45, 49
U.S.C. (1983)).
138. Moore, Rail and Trucking Deregulation, in REGULATORY REFORM: WHAT ACTUALLY HAP-
PENED? 14, 22 (1986).
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nance."139 The estimates imply present annual efficiency costs of roughly
$2.3 billion, with transfers of $6.8 billion.
An ex post analysis by Barnekov and Kleit shows that rail deregulation
produced annual efficiency benefits of between $9.7 and $16.2 billion. 4
This figure differs sharply from Boyer's estimates. Boyer finds the upper
bound of benefits to be only $102 million.141 Since this dispute has not yet
been resolved, we choose to use the consensus estimates of regulatory rail
costs that Winston reports. 142 The efficiency benefits of the partial rail dereg-
ulation are approximately $4.6 billion, with transfers of $13.8 billion.
Postal Rates
While definitive estimates are not available, the President's Privatization
Report indicates that eliminating the monopoly over postal service provision
would provide annual cost savings on the order of between $4 and $12 bil-
lion. 143 These calculations are based on the wage premium purportedly
granted to postal employees -relative to counterparts working for private
employers. 144 However, a large portion of the wage differences arises be-
cause the U.S. Postal Service pays women and nonwhite employees wages
similar to those of white men, whereas gender and race correlate with wage
differences in the private sector.4 5
Another study estimates that ending the postal monopoly could save the
United States over $10 billion annually, while citing an FTC estimate that
efficiency bonuses would save $1.5 billion a year. 146 Utt estimates that the
public could save as much as $5 billion by contracting out.'47 These estimates
are loosely constructed, however, and do not necessarily represent efficiency
gains to the economy as a whole. Nevertheless, the 1982 relaxation of the
Private Express Statutes148 allowed considerable innovation in the postal
delivery market. New firms such as Federal Express, as well as existing
carriers such as the United Parcel Service, rushed to fill the expanding and
139. Id.
140. C. BARNEKOV & A. KLEIT, supra note 95, at 1 (between $9.0 and $15.0 billion in 1986 dollars).
141. Boyer, supra note 18, at 415 ($93 million in 1985 dollars).
142. Winston, supra note 93, at 84.
143. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE
GOVERNMENT 113 (1988).
144. Asher& Popkin, The Effect of Gender and Race Differentials on Public-Private Wage Compari-
sons: A Study of Postal Workers, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 16 (1984); Perloff & Wachter, Wage
Comparability in the U.S. Postal Service, 38 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 26 (1984).
145. Asher & Popkin, supra note 144, at 16.
146. J. BOVARD, THE SLOW DEATH OF THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE 16 (Cato Institute Policy Analysis
No. 102, 1988).
147. R. UTT, How To MOVE THE POSTAL SERVICE TRULY OFF BUDGET 6 (Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 716, 1989).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1725 (1988).
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lucrative overnight mail service.149 To our knowledge, however, there are
no estimates of the efficiency gains accruing to the economy from such dere-
gulatory initiatives.
Milk Marketing Orders and Price Supports
The annual cost of regulating milk markets has been reported to be as high
as $2.1 billion,150 although much of that figure includes transfer payments.
Ippolito and Masson assess total efficiency costs of milk regulation at $333 to
$653 million15I and transfer payments at between $666 and $1,332 million
annually.152 Kwoka estimates a total efficiency cost of $615 million 113 with
transfers of over $2,454 million. 154
An additional -study quantifies the costs and transfers involved in milk price
supports. Buxton and Hammond estimate a deadweight loss of between $31
and $227 million if the products are redistributed back to consumers, and $220
to $1,073 million if the milk products are destroyed. 155 They estimate trans-
fer payments between $336 and $2,040 million. 156
In sum, the total efficiency loss is roughly one-third of transfer payments
in milk regulation and price supports. For both programs, the deadweight loss
ranges from $0.4 to $0.9 billion, while transfer payments total between $0.9
and $3.5 billion.
Natural Gas
Several studies have estimated the cost of natural gas price controls, most
of which Congress finished removing in 1981.' Using an econometric
model, MacAvoy and Pindyck predicted that natural gas price deregulation
149. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 143, at 101.
150. M. WEIDENBAUM & R. DEFINA, supra note 11, at 11 ($1 billion in 1976 dollars).
151. R. Ippolito & R. Masson, The Social Costs of Federal Regulation of Milk (Jan. 1976) (unpub-
lished manuscript), reported in FEDERAL MILK MARKETING ORDERS AND PRICE SUPPORTS 111 (P.
MacAvoy ed. 1977) [hereinafter MILK MARKETING] ($125 to $245 million in 1973 dollars).
152. Id. (between $250 and $500 million in 1973 dollars).
153. J. Kwoka, Pricing under Federal Milk Marketing Regulation: Theory, Objectives, and Impact
25 (1975) (unpublished manuscript), reported in MILK MARKETING, supra note 151, at 111 ($202 million
in 1970 dollars).
154. Id. ($805 million in 1970 dollars).
155. Buxton & Hammond, Social Cost ofAlternative Dairy Price Support Levels, 56 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 286 (1974); reported in MILK MARKETNG, supra note 151, at 109 (between $13 and $95 million,
and $92 to $447 million in 1974 dollars).
156. Id. at 109 (between $140 and $850 million in 1974 dollars).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). See Loury, Efficiency and Equity Impacts of Deregulahion, in PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE AND POLICY ANALYSIS 301, 323 (1983).
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would produce efficiency gains of $6.0 billion in 1978 and $13.9 billion in
1980.151
Using partial equilibrium analysis, Loury estimates the efficiency cost of
natural gas controls at $3.7 billion per year in the short run."s9 He estimates
the efficiency gains of natural gas price decontrol at $6.8 billion per year over
the long run. 6' Loury adds that these estimates are lower bounds of
efficiency gains since regulated gas is not allocated based on price.16 1 Using
Loury's figures, we calculate that potential annual transfer payments were
$83.8 billion, again far higher than efficiency costs.
Jorgenson and Slesnick use general equilibrium analysis to estimate the
effects of changes in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. 162 Continued con-
trols under the Act lead to a projected average annual efficiency loss of $1.2
billion between 1983 and 2000.163 They estimate that immediate decontrol
would lead to an average efficiency gain of $3.8 billion over the same
period. 164
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 deregulated the natural gas industry,
although the Act's effects were less comprehensive than those after the deregu-
lation of the oil industry. Regulation still exists for interstate markets in "old
gas" from Prudhoe Bay in Alaska, from some offshore areas, and from
stripper wells.165 However, the bulk of the market is deregulated in terms
of price and allocation, and the "new gas" portion of the market is growing
over time as the "old gas" fields are depleted. 66 In addition, President Bush
recently signed the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989,167 which
will fully deregulate the natural gas market. 68
According to recent ICC estimates, roughly 40 % of the natural gas market
is subject to price regulation; at present, however, regulation is binding on
only 6% .169 Therefore, we estimate that the efficiency cost of natural gas
158. P. MACAVOY & R. PINDYCK, PRICE CONTROLS AND THE NATURAL GAS SHORTAGE 54 (1975),
reported in Brauetigam & Hubbard, Natural Gas: The Regulatory Transition, in REGULATORY REFORM:
WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED?, supra note 138, at 149 ($2.5 billion and $5.8 billion in 1974 dollars).
159. Loury, supra note 157, at 307 ($2.9 billion in 1981 dollars).
160. Id. ($5.2 billion in 1981 dollars).
161. Id. at 305 (inferred from Loury's graph).
162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988). See Jorgenson & Slesnick, General Equilibrium Analysis of
Price Regulation, in PUBLIC REGULATION, supra note 90, at 153.
163. Jorgenson & Slesnick, supra note 162, at 184 ($407 million in 1972 dollars).
164. Id. ($1.3 billion in 1972 dollars).
165. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312(e), 3313(d), 3314-3315, 3318-3319, 3331(d) (1988); 18 C.F.R. §§ 2.56b,
271.801-807 (1990). See Brauetigam & Hubbard, supra note 158, at 164.
166. Kalt & Leone, Regional Effects of Energy Price Decontrol: The Roles of Interregional Trade,
Stockholding, and Microeconomic Incidence, 17 RAND J. ECON. 201, 202 (1986).
167. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1989).
168. Schneider, Bush Signs Bill Ending Gas Controls, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1989, at D1, col. 6.
169. Letter from Dr. H.A. Merklein, Administrator of the Energy Information Administration, to
Representative Philip R. Sharp, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Power (Apr. 3,
1989).
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regulation at present is only 6% of that estimated by Loury prior to deregula-
tion, or $0.2 to $0.4 billion, with transfers totalling $5.0 billion. If natural gas
market prices rise in the future, those figures could escalate rapidly in the
absence of complete decontrol. We estimate the efficiency benefits of natural
gas deregulation at $5.0 billion, with transfers of over $79.0 billion.
Credit, Ocean, and Barge
These three estimates of regulatory costs represent updates of estimates that
Litan and Nordhaus provide. Citing a General Accounting Office study, Litan
and Nordhaus estimate credit regulation efficiency costs to be between $0.2
and $2.1 billion in 1977.170 According to Jantsher, ocean shipping regulation
(cabotage laws) cost between $0.2 and $0.3 billion annually. 171 Barge regula-
tion estimates, which Litan and Nordhaus provide without documentation,
range from $0.8 to $1.2 billion. 172 We applied the ratio of three dollars of
transfers to one dollar of efficiency costs 173 to each of these sets of numbers
to derive the efficiency cost and transfer payment estimates indicated in Table
1.
Davis-Bacon Act
The Davis-Bacon Act 174 requires that the federal government award con-
tracts that pay workers "prevailing wages" and benefits in order to protect
local laborers from the less costly national labor market.'75 A study by for-
mer Congressman John Anderson based on Gould's econometric model indi-
cates that average wages are 6.5% higher under the Act than if it were re-
pealed. 76 According to Weidenbaum and DeFina, this differential amounts
to a cost of $1.2 billion. 77 Thieblot calculates the difference between the
lowest initial bids with the Act and similar re-bids when the Act was suspended
momentarily.7 7 He finds that without the Act, bids were 0.63% lower. 171
170. R. LrrAN& W. NORDHAUS, supra note 12, at23 (between $0.1 and $1.1 billion in 1977 dollars).
171. G. JANTSCHER, BREAD UPON THE WATERS: FEDERAL AID TO THE MARITIME INDUSTRIES 52
(1975), reported in R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 12 (between $0.1 and $0.15 billion in 1977
dollars).
172. R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUs, supra note 12, at 23 ($0.4 to $0.6 billion in 1977 dollars).
173. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
174. 40 U.S.C. §§ 276(a)-276(a)(5) (1988).
175. See J. GoULD & G. BITTLINGMAYER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT: AN
ANALYSIS OF PREVAILING WAGE LAWS 1-4 (American Enterprise Institute Study No. 278, 1980).
176. Reported in M. WEIDENBAUM& R. DEFINA, supra note 11, at 18. See J. GOULD & G. BrrrLNG-
MAYER, supra note 175, at 69-74.
177. M. WEIDENBAUM & R. DEFINA, supra note 11, at 18 ($0.6 billion in 1976 dollars).
178. A. THIEBLOT, THE DAVIS-BACON ACT (Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania, Labor Relations & Public Policy Series Report No. 10, 1975).
179. Id.
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Weidenbaum and DeFina calculate that the government could save $0.6 billion
per year if Congress repealed the Act.'
However, these estimates include transfer payments to workers and firms
awarded federal construction contracts, and do not reflect welfare losses
alone. 1 ' A study detailing the efficiency costs should include the Act's effect
of inducing inefficient capital-labor ratios and the effect of preventing national
firms from realizing full economies of scale for private projects. In lieu of such
a study, using the previously discussed ratio of 3:1 for transfers to efficiency
costs,182 we estimate the efficiency loss to be $0.2 billion with transfers
totaling $0.5 billion.
Bus
Deregulating buses through the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982183
appears to have had only modest impacts on efficiency and service. It did not,
as many expected, dramatically decrease the bus service to rural localities.184
Oster and Zorn argue that at most bus deregulation accelerated the trend away
from servicing small communities that predated the 1982 Act.' However,
the benefits of deregulation were relatively minor as well. Meyer and Oster
state that "bus costs in 1980 [pre-deregulation] were very low under a wide
array of market circumstances, even without further rationalization. "186 They
do not, however, provide any estimates of the national savings from bus
deregulation.
180. M. WEIDENBAUM & R. DEFINA, supra note 11, at 17 ($0.2 billion in 1976 dollars). The estimate
in 1988 dollars is based on total outlays for major capital investment of $100.2 billion in 1988. See U.S.
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 1990, at 158 (1989). Weidenbaum and DeFina calculate their figures based on government spending
on construction of $38.0 billion dollars in 1976 (in 1976 dollars). See supra note 11, at 17.
181. M. WEIDEN3AUM & R. DEFINA, supra note 11, at 17, acknowledge this point, but still include
the figure as an estimate of the cost of regulation.
182. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
183. Pub. L. No. 97-261, 96 Stat. 1102 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 26, 39 U.S.C. (1988)).
184. Oster and Zorn note that although many companies overreacted to deregulation by cutting routes,
services to rural communities increased after 1983 in Florida, for example, where state deregulation
preceded federal deregulation by two years. Oster & Zorn, Impacts of Regulatory Reform on Intercity Bus
Service in the United States, 25 TRANSP. J. 33, 33 (1986). This reversal underscores the importance of
tracing out the long-term consequences of deregulation rather than focusing on short-term changes. Indeed,
Oster and Zorn conclude: "If the experiences of both the airline industry and the Florida bus industry prove
to be a good indication of the longer-run response to a relaxation of regulatory restrictions, then the trends
found in a study covering only three years of post-deregulation activity might overstate the expected future
losses." Id. at 41.
185. Id. at 33.
186. J. MEYER & C. OSTER, DEREGULATION AND THE FUTURE OF INTERCITY PASSENGER TRAVEL
175 (1987).
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Trucking
Considerable confusion appears to exist in the literature on the costs of
trucking regulation. The confusion lies in separating transfers from efficiency
costs. Felton finds that the "social cost," excluding transfers, of trucking
regulation is $11.0 billion. ' Moore estimates that the cost of inefficient use
of private and common carrier trucking ranges from $5.1 to $9.9 billion, '
and that the annual cost of traffic carried by trucks that could more cheaply
be carried by rail is another $0.7 to $9.9 billion. 89 Moore's total costs of
trucking regulation are therefore between $5.8 and $19.8 billion. 9 o Felton's
estimate falls within these bounds.
These estimates of cost, while important in assessing political impacts,
include substantial transfers to industry and labor. At the time, Moore
concluded that "there is no convincing economic rationale for the trucking
firms sharing monopoly gains with labor."' 9' However, subsequent research
points to "substantial declines in union wages as a consequence of reduced
regulatory rents," especially for the Teamsters. 9' Other research shows that
regulation created monopoly profits for owners of trucking firms.' 93 In a
subsequent article, Moore notes that rents may have been substantial.' 94 He
concludes that, "three-quarters or more of the cost to shippers and ultimately
to consumers of trucking regulation take the form of income transfers to labor
and capital involved in trucking. "' His research indicates that total income
transfers in 1972 amounted to between $7.1 and $9.3 billion.' 96 Trucking
deregulation provided evidence that much of the "social costs" earlier studies
measured actually were transfers to owners and labor.
We try to separate the welfare costs from transfers in estimating the effects
of trucking regulation. Using Moore's estimate that "three-quarters or more"
of previously-estimated costs actually are transfers, we estimate that total
efficiency costs in the late 1970s were $1.5 to $4.9 billion with transfers of
$4.3 to $14.9 billion. However, due to deregulation in the late 1970s, today's
costs are considerably smaller. Although some federal trucking regulation
187. Felton, The Costs and Benefits of Motor Truck Regulation, Q. REv. ECON. & Bus., Summer
1978, at 7, 14 ($5.3 billion in 1976 dollars).
188. Moore, Deregulating Surface Freight Transportation, in PROMOTING COMPETmION N
REGULATED MARKETS 55, 71 (A. Phillips ed. 1975) ($1.5 to $2.9 billion in 1968 dollars).
189. Id. at 71 ($0.2 to $2.9 billion in 1968 dollars).
190. Id. (between $1.7 and $5.8 billion in 1968 dollars).
191. Id. at 61.
192. Rose, Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the Trucking Industry, 95 J. POL.
ECON. 1146, 1175 (1987).
193. Rose, The Incidence of Regulatory Rents in the Motor Carrier Industry, 16 RAND J. ECON. 299,
299 (1985).
194. Moore, The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation, 21 J.L. & EcON. 327, 342 (1978).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 342 (between $2.5 and $3.3 billion in 1972 dollars).
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exists, open entry and variable rate schedules combine to make the current
climate virtually competitive.197 No recent studies are available that estimate
the current cost of regulating trucking. We assume for purposes of this analysis
that the present trucking regulatory costs are negligible, implying that the
efficiency gains from trucking deregulation are between $1.5 and $4.9 billion.
Oil Price Controls
Arrow and Kalt estimate that the cost of oil price controls lies between $3.1
and $6.6 billion.198 Kalt estimates that the sum of efficiency losses for con-
sumers and producers is $1.4 to $7.2 billion per year, plus another $1.4 billion
in private and public sector administrative costs.199 He finds that the windfall
profits tax costs an extra $2.9 billion, for a total welfare loss of $5.7 to $11.5
billion per year.2" Kalt also estimates that annual transfer payments total
between $70.3 and $122.0 billion,20' over ten times the welfare losses.
President Carter's program of gradual decontrol of oil prices and alloca-
tions, beginning in 1979, ended with the Reagan Administration's complete
decontrol in 1981.2 °2 Although some federal regulations pertaining to the oil
industry remain (for example, environmental regulations concerning Alaskan
drilling and tankers), no available studies measure their effects. As a result,
for this study we have assumed the present cost of federal price and allocation
regulations to be negligible. Therefore, we estimate the benefits of oil deregu-
lation to be between $5.7 and $11.5 billion, with transfers between $70.3 and
$122.0 billion.
Cable Television
The Comanor and Mitchell study provides an estimate of the welfare costs
of FCC regulation of cable television. °" Litan and Nordhaus report that
Comanor and Mitchell calculate an annual deadweight loss of between $3.9
and $7.8 billion.2 °" However, Comanor and Mitchell's figures represent "the
197. OFF. OF TRANSP. ANAL., INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM'N, HIGHLIGHTS OF ACTIVITY IN THE
PROPERTY MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY (Staff Report No. 11, Aug. 1987).
198. K. ARROw & J. KALT, PETROLEUM PRICE REGULATION: SHOULD WE DECONTROL? 26-27
(1979), reported in R. LlrT & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 12, at 23 ($1.6 to $3.4 billion in 1977 dollars).
199. J. KALT, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF OIL PRICE REGULATION 233-34 (1981) ($1.0 to
$5.0 billion, and $1.0 billion in 1980 dollars).
200. Id. at 233-34 ($2.0 billion and $4.0 to $8.0 billion in 1980 dollars).
201. Id. (between $49.0 and $85.0 billion in 1980 dollars).
202. Hubbard & Weiner, Petroleum Regulation and Public Policy, in REGULATORY REFORM: WHAT
ACTUALLY HAPPENED?, supra note 138, at 105, 114-15.
203. Comanor & Mitchell, The Costs of Planning: The FCC and Cable Television, 15 J.L. & ECON.
177 (1972), reported in R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 12, at 23 ("Broadcast and Cable TV,"
Table 2.6).
204. R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 12, at 23 (between $2.0 and $4.0 billion in 1977 dollars).
Vol. 8: 233, 1990
The Costs and Benefits of Regulation
capitalized value of the prospective welfare loss" [emphasis added], which they
state "may easily lie between $1 billion and $2 billion at the current [1972]
price level."205 The annualized value of this efficiency loss, using Comanor
and Mitchell's assumptions of a 15-year lifetime discounted at 10% per
year,"° ranges between $370 and $740 million.20 7 Further, using rough
estimates Comanor and Mitchell provide in Figure 1,208 we calculate that
transfer payments involved in cable television regulation far exceed efficiency
costs, and could range from $1.7 to $3.4 billion.2" These costs have dimin-
ished considerably after passage of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984.21' We assume here that federal regulation imposes zero costs.2
A2. The Costs and Benefits of Social Regulation
Environment (Costs)
Numerous studies attempt to evaluate the costs and benefits of
environmental regulation. Some address parts of environmental legislation (for
example, the Clean Air Act212) while others try to evaluate the combined
costs.
The U.S. Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) prepared one of the
first estimates.2"3 Using pollution control expenditure statistics gathered from
several federal agencies, predominantly EPA, the CEQ estimates that air
pollution control costs were $30.1 billion in 1978, with water pollution adding
another $18.5 billion.214 Comparable projections for 1987 were $67.9 billion
and $37.0 billion for air and water respectively. 2"5 According to the CEQ,
all environmental regulations imposed added expenditures of $48.8 billion in
1978 and an estimated $116.1 in 1987.216 Annual capital costs were about
205. Comanor & Mitchell, supra note 203, at 205.
206. Id. at 202, 205.
207. Between $131 and $262 million in 1972 dollars.
208. Comanor & Mitchell, supra note 203, at 199.
209. Id. ($0.6 to $1.2 billion in 1972 dollars, using a transfer to efficiency cost ratio of 4.7:1
generated from their estimates).
210. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, 47, 50 U.S.C.
(1988)).
211. For an overview of the current status of cable regulation, see Krech & NTIA Staff, Cable
Television, in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NTIA TELECOM 2000: CHARTING THE COURSE FOR A NEW
CENTURY 539, 546-50 (NTIA Special Publication No. 88-21, 1988).
212. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
213. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVrL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1979: THE TENTH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1979).
214. Id. ($16.6 billion and $10.2 billion in 1978 dollars).
215. Id. ($37.4 billion and $20.4 billion in 1978 dollars).
216. Id. ($26.9 billion and $64.0 billion in 1978 dollars).
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one-half the totals while operation and maintenance costs comprised the
remainder." 7
Denison uses changes in productivity measures to estimate the total cost
of environmental regulation at $21.1 billion in 1975.218 This figure is roughly
three times his estimate (in nominal dollars) for pollution abatement costs just
three years earlier.21 9
The Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) con-
ducts survey analyses of the private costs businesses expend in order to meet
existing pollution regulations. The body of this Article discusses the problems
with the survey method approach. 2" The most recent survey finds that pri-
vate expenditures on pollution control and abatement totalled $84.0 billion in
1986.221 Air pollution costs were $35.9 billion, water pollution $32.9, and
solid waste and other costs comprised the balance, or $15.2 billion.
In its periodic evaluations required by Congress, EPA has conducted
studies assessing the costs of clean air and water regulation. Building on the
BEA's relatively simple direct approaches, EPA finds that the total annual
private cost of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts was $55.4 billion in
1981.222
Freeman, updating 1980 CEQ figures, estimates that water pollution costs
in 1985 lie between $28.5 and $34.2 billion. 23 Hazilla and Kopp apply gen-
eral equilibrium analysis to the costs of federal clean air and water regulations
and find significantly higher costs of $77.6 billion 224 compared with an EPA
estimate of $61.6 billion. 225 They attribute the difference, which escalates
rapidly, to the expansion over time of the intertemporal impacts major regula-
tions have on microeconomic decisions, and to the ability of general
equilibrium analysis to uncover effects in related industries that partial analysis
ignores.226 Jorgenson and Wilcoxen estimate that environmental regulation
reduces the level of gross national product by 2.59% .227
217. Id. at 666-67.
218. E. DENISON, supra note 48, at 71 ($9.5 billion in 1975 dollars).
219. Id. ($3.2 billion in 1975 dollars).
220. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
221. Farber & Rutledge, supra note 21, at 28 ($77.8 billion in 1986 dollars).
222. OFF. OF POL'Y ANAL., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, COST OF CLEAN AIR AND WATER:
REPORT TO CONoRESS (1984), reported in Hazilla & Kopp, supra note 36, at 858 ($42.5 billion in 1981
dollars).
223. Freeman, supra note 74, at 126 (between $25.2 and $30.8 billion in 1984 dollars).
224. Hazilla & Kopp, supra note 36, at 865 ($70.6 billion in 1985 dollars).
225. Id. ($56.0 billion in 1985 dollars).
226. Id. at 855.
227. Jorgenson & Wilcoxen, supra note 37, at 315. Jorgenson and Wilcoxen do not consider the
possible benefits from environmental investment that could increase output. These benefits could be
substantial, but are highly uncertain. See infra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
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Environment (Benefits)
Portney, who adapted the work of Freeman, estimates the benefits of air
pollution regulation at between $10.0 and $104.3 billion per year, with a "best
guess" of $42.5 billion. 22' Three-fourths of the benefits he estimates are
health-related, and are sensitive to the "value-of-life" (VOL) numbers he
chooses. However, Freeman probably understates the value of clean air
benefits because he estimates a negligible improvement in auto emissions
during the years he studies, 1970 to 1978, even though vehicle-miles driven
increased significantly over this period.229 Because of the increase in effec-
tive compliance over the last ten years, the benefits of reducing auto emissions
may be considerable. The benefit figures in Table 2 then represent a lower
bound." 0 Freeman estimates that in 1985 water pollution regulations added
benefits of between $6.5 and $31.5 billion with $15.9 billion most likely.231
The estimates in Table 2 reflect these estimates for the benefits of cleaner air
and water, with a point estimate of $58.4 billion.
Lave and Seskin, modifying results from other studies, report annual health
benefits (mortality and morbidity) from air pollution regulations alone totalling
$42.9 billion.232 Their estimate is conservative because it does not include
less soiling, reduced damage to agriculture, improved visibility, and other
benefits of cleaner air.233
Highway Safety
Using both engineering and econometric approaches (from which he obtains
relatively similar estimates), Crandall estimates the cost of automobile safety
regulations at between $9.1 and $13.4 billion including the bumper standard,
and between $6.4 and $9.0 billion without the standard. 34 The ranges reflect
differences in the safety coefficient and in assumptions about the manufacturing
learning curve in producing automobiles at least cost.
228. Portney, supra note 74, at 57 (between $8.8 and $91.6 billion in 1984 dollars (converted by
Portney from 1978 dollars)).
229. Id. at-58.
230. Freeman, supra note 74, at 123.
231. Id. (between $5.7 and $27.7 billion, with $14.0 billion most likely in 1984 dollars (converted
by Freeman from 1978 dollars)).
232. L. LAVE & E. SESKIN, AiR POLLUTION AND HUMAN HEALTH 225 (1977) ($16.1 billion in 1973
dollars).
233. Id. at 226.
234. CRANDALL, supra note 10, at 77 (between $7.0 and $10.3 billion, and between $4.9 and $6.9
billion in 1981 dollars).
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As with most estimates of the benefits of regulation, significant disagree-
ment exists over the benefits of automobile safety regulation.235 Peltzman
argues that because of mandated safety regulations, people drive more
recklessly.236 He finds that while safety regulations result in some reduction
in loss of auto occupants' lives, such offsetting behavior led to an equal or
greater increase in the number of pedestrian deaths and nonfatal accidents.237
As a result, Peltzman's contention is that automobile safety regulation not only
has failed to save lives, but may even have caused additional deaths due to its
influence on driver behavior.
Surely, the imposition of NHTSA regulations alone cannot explain the
reduction in the rate of traffic fatalities; other beneficial effects on safety
include such factors as improved road surfaces and lighting, the imposition of
the fifty-five miles-per-hour speed limit, stricter drunk-driving laws, and other
influences that have coincided with added NHTSA regulations. 238 Moreover,
the argument supposes that in the absence of regulation, automobile companies
would not make such safety improvements voluntarily. While we are reluctant
to overemphasize their willingness to try to sell safety equipment, consumer
demand today probably would induce automobile companies to install such
safety features as passenger restraints (seat belts) and rearview mirrors, at a
minimum.
Peltzman's argument has come under attack from a number of angles.
Graham and Garber show that Peltzman's results are highly sensitive to
plausible changes in specification.239 Behavioralists contend that driving is
such a complex endeavor that individuals use simple rules or heuristics in order
to decide upon their actions.24 If the behavioralists are correct, imposing
additional safety features may change individual driving behavior very little.
One hypothesis is that because the probability of a crash is so low, drivers treat
the chance as if it were zero, implicitly ignoring the possibility of serious
injury. A second hypothesis is that while drivers are sensitive to changes in
accident frequency, perhaps because they have such little experience, they act
as if they are insensitive to crash severity.24 However, this second hypothe-
235. Compare NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., HIGHWAY
SAFETY 1985, at 1 (1988) ("[Tlhe safety picture has improved significantly since the passage of the basic
legislation in 1966") with Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677
(1975).
236. Peltzman, supra note 235, at 677.
237. Id.
238. INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, STATUS REPORT, Sept. 9, 1986, at 2.
239. Graham & Garber, Evaluating the Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 3 J. POL'Y ANAL.
& MGMT. 206 (1984).
240. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
241. Graham & Gardner, supra note 239, at 209.
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sis would not preclude Peltzman's offsetting effects in the case of collision
avoidance regulations such as windshield wipers and lighting/reflecting devices.
The debate has made both extreme positions untenable. Automobile regula-
tions neither have prevented every highway death over the past 25 years, nor
have they been completely ineffective (or even life-threatening). Using both
time-series and cross-sectional evidence, Crandall estimates that a large
improvement in highway safety is attributable to regulations.242 The study
estimates the benefits of regulation at between $7.6 and $45.7 billion, depend-
ing on the optimism of the assumptions and whether one values lives saved at
$0.4 or $1.3 million.243 A $1.3 million "value of life" yields a range of
automobile regulatory benefits between $25.4 and $45.7 billion.244 Even the
lower end of the benefit estimate ($25.4 billion) exceeds the most expensive
cost estimate ($13.4 billion).245
Occupational Safety and Health
Using productivity changes, Denison estimates mining safety regulatory
costs at $4.9 billion, and total employee safety and health regulations at $9.0
billion.246 Crandall, implementing a capital expenditures approach, reports
that the total cost of occupational health and safety regulations in 1985 was
$8.5 billion.2 47 Given the difference in their methodologies, Denison and
Crandall arrive at remarkably similar cost estimates.
Though a number of studies have estimated the costs and benefits of
individual OSHA regulations, few have tried to calculate the combined benefits
of all occupational health and safety regulation. One economist, who has had
considerable experience studying OSHA regulations, concludes that the effects
of worker safety regulations have been negligible.248 Viscusi states, "The
industry data I analyzed suggests that OSHA inspections or penalties have had
no significant effect on worker injuries and illnesses. "249 Lave, after review-
ing the results from a number of studies on OSHA, also concludes that "OSHA
had little or no effect on accident rates, even in targeted industries where its
resources were focused. 25° In the absence of credible studies showing posi-
242. CRANDALL, supra note 10, at 74.
243. Id. at 77 ($0.3 to $1.0 million in 1981 dollars).
244. Id. ($19.5 to $35.1 billion in 1981 dollars).
245. Id. ($10.3 billion in 1981 dollars).
246. E. DENISON, supra note 48, at 72 ($2.2 billion and $4.1 billion in 1975 dollars).
247. Crandall, What Ever Happened to Deregulation?, in ASSESSING THE REAGAN YEARS 271, 286
(D. Boaz ed. 1988) ($6.9 billion in 1982 dollars).
248. W. VIscusi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 35
(1983).
249. Id. at 33-34.
250. L. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 102
(1981).
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tive benefits of OSHA regulations, we conclude that the net costs total roughly
$8.5 billion per year.
This figure, however, probably represents an upper bound. Although
Viscusi may be correct in ascribing no benefits to OSHA regulation, the costs
ascribed to OSHA's regulations may overstate the actual costs. Firms may have
instituted many of the safety features now found in the workplace for other
reasons, such as labor market pressures. Viscusi himself states that OSHA
"regulations have not been particularly effective in altering firms' incentives
to invest in safety."251 While OSHA regulations may have resulted in few
workplace benefits, they also may not be the primary or even most significant
factor responsible for increased costs.
Nuclear Power
Citing a DOE policy study, Litan and Nordhaus state that nuclear power
regulations impose annual efficiency losses of $5.3 to $7.6 billion. 2
Drug Approval
Peltzman's 1973 study was the first to try to quantify the economic effects
of the 1962 Drug Amendments.253 His analysis measures (1) the market
demand curve for the uninformed consumer who, through a physician's advice,
trial and error, or some other method learns that the drug is ineffective, and
(2) the informed consumer demand curve, which shifts inward (the informed
consumer is willing to pay less for a given quantity of the drug than the
uninformed consumer). After measuring this demand shift and computing the
welfare effects, Peltzman finds that the net effect of the amendments was
equivalent to a tax on 5% to 10% of annual drug purchases.254 With consum-
ers spending nearly $30 billion per year on legal drugs,255 the social cost
(deadweight loss) would amount to between $1.5 and $3.0 billion per year.
McGuire sharply criticizes the Peltzman study for ignoring the impact on
the opposite type of consumer: one who is overly skeptical and only reluctantly
tries new drugs (perhaps because of past experience). 6 One may describe
these consumers' buying patterns using demand curves that shift out as the
251. Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of Product Safety Regulation, 28 J. L. &
ECON. 527, 527-28 (1985).
252. R. LrrAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 12, at 22 ($2.7 to $3.9 billion in 1977 dollars).
253. S. Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments,
81 J. POL. ECON. 1049 (1973).
254. Id. at 1090.
255. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 412 (1988).
256. McGuire, Nelson, & Spavins, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug
Amendments: A Comment, 83 J. POL. EcON. 655 (1975).
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overly skeptical consumer learns more about a given drug. McGuire claims
that since Peltzman measures market responses to drugs, he ignores the inde-
pendent benefits accruing to both types of consumers from added informa-
tion."' In other words, Peltzman measures an aggregate demand curve when
one ought to model both responses separately. Unfortunately, McGuire does
not present new estimates of the effects of drug regulation using their improved
framework.
Since Peltzman's study of over fifteen years ago, drug regulation has
undergone considerable change. Delay times for FDA approval dropped
considerably in the 1980s. 8 In addition, the FDA recently instituted deregu-
latory measures to speed the procedures by which companies submit new drug
applications, s9 although it is too early to assess their effects. To our knowl-
edge, however, no subsequent estimates of the cost of drug regulation exist.
In light of these changes, Peltzman's estimate is best interpreted as an upper
bound on net social costs.
Equal Employment Opportunity
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) requires that
employers maintain records of hiring and firing decisions, and in some cases
conduct affirmative action programs.26 Record-keeping and program imple-
mentation can demand valuable employee time and impose significant legal
costs. Weidenbaum and DeFina estimate that such costs total roughly $0.9
billion.261 We include this estimate in our total social regulatory cost, though
the benefits of EEOC actions easily may exceed compliance costs. However,
the benefits are extremely difficult to quantify.
Consumer Product Safety
To our knowledge, there have been no definitive estimates of the cumula-
tive costs imposed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) on
industry and consumers (for example, by banning the sale of allegedly hazard-
ous toys such as lawn darts). Weidenbaum and DeFina note that the CPSC's
administrative cost was $42 million in 1976, but add that compliance costs
were not available.262 Since the 1988 budget outlays for the CPSC were
257. Id. at 657.
258. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PUB. HEALTH SERV., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., NEw DRUG
EVALUATION: STATISTICAL REPORT 34 (1987).
259. FDA Acts to Speed Approval of Drugs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1989, at C3, col. 6.
260. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1602.1-.55, 1608.1-.12 (1990).
261. M. WEIDENBAUM & R. DEFINA, supra note 11, at 4 ($0.4 billion in 1976 dollars).
262. M. WEIDENBAUM & R. DEFINA, supra note 11, at 3.
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roughly $34 million,2 63 we use that estimate as the cost of CPSC regulation,
recognizing that it is a lower bound and that compliance costs probably make
the total costs much higher.
One study examines the CPSC's potential benefits, or its impact on safety.
Using an econometric analysis of the CPSC's effects as well as case studies,
Viscusi finds "no evidence of any significant beneficial impacts [of CPSC
regulation] on product safety. 2 64 The results of a study by Rubin confirm
Viscusi's findings.265 Indeed, the most frequent injuries are those over which
the CPSC has little influence (falling down stairs and sports injuries). Com-
pared with the magnitude of regulatory costs and benefits in other arenas, those
measured for the CPSC are insignificant. The relatively small magnitude of
these costs, however, does not reflect the costs the CPSC imposes on produc-
ers, lenders, and shareholders due to litigation and bankruptcy.
263. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1990, at 9-161 (1990).
264. Viscusi, supra note 251, at 529.
265. Rubin, Dennis & Jarrell, Risky Products, Risky Stocks, REGULATION, Jan.- Feb. 1988, at 35,
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